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INTRODUCTION 
British tradition and the American Constitution guarantee trial by jury for 
serious crime.1 But terrorism is not ordinary crime, and the presence of jurors 
may skew the manner in which terrorist trials unfold in at least three significant 
ways. 
First, organized terrorist groups may deliberately threaten jury members so 
the accused escapes penalty. The more ingrained the terrorist organization in 
the fabric of society, the greater the degree of social control exerted under the 
ongoing threat of violence. 
Second, terrorism, at heart a political challenge, may itself politicize a jury. 
Where nationalist conflict rages, as it does in Northern Ireland, juries may be 
sympathetic to those engaged in violence and may acquit the guilty. 
Alternatively, following a terrorist attack, juries may be biased. They may 
identify with the victims, or they may, consciously or unconsciously, seek to 
return a verdict that conforms to community sentiment. Jurors also may worry 
about becoming victims of future attacks. 
Third, the presence of jurors may limit the type of information provided by 
the state. Where national security matters are involved, the government may 
not want to give ordinary citizens insight into the world of intelligence. Where 
deeply divisive political violence has been an issue for decades, the state may 
be concerned about the potential of jurors providing information to terrorist 
organizations. 
These risks are not limited to the terrorist realm. Criminal syndicates, for 
instance, may try to intimidate juries into returning a verdict of not guilty, and 
public outrage often accompanies particularly heinous crimes. But the very 
reason why these other contexts give rise to a similar phenomenon is because 
terrorist crimes have certain characteristics—characteristics that may be 
reflected in other forms of crime, but which are, in many ways, at the heart of 
what it means for an act to be terrorist in nature: terrorist organizations are 
created precisely to coerce a population, or specific individuals, to accede to the 
group’s demands. The challenge is political in nature, and the method of attack 
is chosen for maximum publicity. Terrorist organizations, moreover, can and 
often do use information about the state to guide their operations. It is in part 
because of these risks that the United Kingdom and United States have changed 
the rules governing terrorist trials—at times eliminating juries altogether. 
 
1. Most criminal cases in the United Kingdom go before magistrates. In England, cases 
are generally heard by three lay magistrates, who are assisted by a legally qualified “clerk to 
justices.” Alternatively, criminal cases may go before a single Stipendary Magistrate. In 
Northern Ireland, Resident Magistrates preside, without jurors being present. Some cases 
must be placed in the Magistrates Court. Others are assigned to the Crown Court, where 
jurors are present. Yet others have the potential of being assigned either way. This last set is 
divided into numerous categories, some of which allow the decision on the forum for the 
trial to be made by the prosecutor, others the defendant, and others the court. For more 
serious crimes, though, the United Kingdom has traditionally guaranteed juries. 
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This Article reflects on the relationship between terrorism and jury trial 
and explores the extent to which the three dangers identified can be mitigated 
within the criminal-trial framework.2 It does not provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the rich case law and literature that address jury trial—one of the 
most studied legal institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead, its aim is 
more modest: The text weighs the advantages and disadvantages of suspending 
juries specifically for terrorism. Here, the United Kingdom’s experiences prove 
illustrative. The Article considers the extent to which similar concerns bear on 
the U.S. domestic realm, and the decision to try Guantánamo Bay detainees by 
military tribunal. It suggests that the arguments for suspending juries in 
Northern Ireland are more persuasive than for taking similar steps in Great 
Britain or the United States. 
This Article then considers ways to address concerns raised by terrorism 
that stop short of suspending juries. Juror selection, constraints placed on 
jurors, and the conduct of the trial itself provide the focus. Of these, emphasis 
on juror selection, although not unproblematic, proves most promising. Again, 
distinctions need to be drawn between the United Kingdom and the United 
States. In the former, for instance, occupational bars to jury service could be 
lowered, while in the latter, increased emphasis on change in venue may prove 
particularly effective. Changes in the second category, constraints on jurors, 
may be the most damaging to the states’ counterterrorist programs. Finally, 
while changes in the trial process may help to address risks, they also may 
prove contentious and be prone to seeping into the criminal realm. The Article 
concludes by questioning whether and to what extent such alterations could be 
insulated from the prosecution of non-terrorist criminal offenses. 
 
2. An additional concern is the tendency of terrorist organizations to use the trial 
process to further their aims. While this may occur in the absence of a jury, jurors’ 
presence—and the drama of jury trial—may exacerbate the effect. Ted Kaczynski, for 
instance, planned to stake his defense on the claim that technology was destroying 
humanity—the animating cause of his decision to kill and maim several dozen people over a 
seventeen-year period. Greg Lefevre, Kaczynski Admits He Is Unabomber, Sentenced to Life 
Without Parole, CNN.COM, Jan. 22, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/US/9801/22/unabomb.plea/. 
Zacarias Moussaoui also used the trial process to publicize his political message: at his first 
appearance before the District Court, he spent fifty minutes criticizing Israel. Viveca Novak, 
How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled; A Trial Once Described As a Slam Dunk Is Caught In a 
Post-9/11 Legal Wrangle, TIME, Oct. 27, 2003, at 32. His legal documents served in similar 
fashion. See, e.g., Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Have Top Mujahid Brother Mohammed 
at the WTC Trial (World To Circus) and Stop the Pervert Sodom and Gomorah Agents of 
Torturing this Defender of Muslims, United States v. Moussauoi, Cr. No. 01-455-A (E.D. 
Va. Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/ 
68310/1.pdf. Similarly, since 1922, Republican suspects in Northern Ireland have stated that 
they do not recognize the British court system and have on occasion used court appearances 
to further their claims. Courts can combat the use of trials for propaganda purposes through 
contempt of court proceedings, limits on media transmission of trial proceedings, and 
restrictions on who is allowed into the court room. See, e.g., Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 
49 (Eng.); 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2007); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (providing for summary 
disposition of criminal contempt). 
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I. RISKS OF JURY TRIAL 
Jurors’ presence at terrorist trials risks juror intimidation, politicization of 
the jury, and the erection of obstacles to the state’s use of classified evidence. 
This Part briefly discusses these issues and shows how they have arisen in the 
British and American contexts. 
A. Juror Intimidation and the Politicization of the Jury 
Terrorism is, by nature, a threat. The presence of terrorist organizations in 
society creates a risk that jurors will be coerced into finding defendants not 
guilty, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. Beyond this, terrorism tends 
to polarize communities. Individuals sharing the aim of those engaged in the 
struggle may be more willing to acquit an individual accused of subverting the 
state. Conversely, those appalled at the latest acts of violence may be looking to 
find someone—anyone—responsible. Jurors may be biased against defendants 
sharing an ethnic or religious background of those engaged in violence. This 
could influence their ability to evaluate evidence, the way in which juror 
deliberations unfold, and the verdict.3 Even unconsciously, jurors may want to 
return a decision consistent with community sentiment—a community 
potentially angry and scared and mourning the loss of their own. In addition, 
jurors may be afraid of being the future target of attack, making them less 
likely to entertain doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 
These concerns run through the historical experiences of both the United 
Kingdom and the United States in their efforts to address terrorism. For the 
former, Ireland, and later Northern Ireland, proved particularly troubling. 
1. Britain considered 
In nineteenth century Ireland, juror intimidation was practiced with 
remarkable openness. The Irish World newspaper wrote, “‘I dare them to 
convict,’ says the writer, ‘I say “dare” advisedly. Let my words go forth. 
Accursed be the juryman who will dare to find these men (the traversers) guilty 
of any crime against the people of Ireland.’”4 In the south of Ireland, crowds 
lined the streets as the accused were led to trial, shouting out “Down with Cork 
jurors,” “Down with British law.”5 Patrick O’Brien, who went on to become a 
Member of Parliament, obtained a list of members of the jury who were to sit 
 
3. For more extensive discussion of the social psychology of juror bias in the course of 
the trial process, see Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: Juror Prejudice and 
“Terrorist” Trials, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1143 (2003). 
4. HENRY JAMES, THE WORK OF THE IRISH LEAGUES: THE SPEECH OF THE RIGHT HON. 
SIR HENRY JAMES, Q.C., M.P., REPLYING IN THE PARNELL COMMISSION INQUIRY 552 
(London, Cassell & Co. 1890).  
5. Id. 
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on the Phoenix Park murders. He distributed 10,000 copies with the warning: 
“Woe to you if you have any of the goods of these jurors in your house, for 
then you, as well as they, will have the blood and sufferings of innocent people 
upon your head.”6 
Government inquiries focused on what to do about juror intimidation and 
the politicization of jurors.7 The documents examined ways to secure public 
confidence in the legal system. One report noted that in general juries have 
performed their duties well but “in other parts of the country, notably in those 
where agrarian agitation is most prevalent, there is much cause for complaint.”8 
The report found that jury misconduct “comes within [three] well-defined 
categories[:] 1. Crimes arising out of disputes as to the occupation of land. 2. 
Crimes arising out of political or religious antagonism. 3. Aggravated 
assaults.”9 This misconduct, the report continued, “has been attributed by 
different witnesses to (1) want of intelligence, (2) intimidation and fear, (3) 
sympathy with the accused person, or (4) a general disinclination to support the 
law.”10 Reform of the system became a constant refrain in Parliamentary 
debate.11  
Solutions to these problems ranged from suspending jury trial to requiring 
jurors to be landed.12 (The assumption was that the wealthy could not be 
 
6. Id. at 553. 
7. See, e.g., SELECT COMM. ON IRISH JURY LAWS, REPORT TOGETHER WITH THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, AND APPENDIX, 1881, H.L 430; 
SELECT COMM. ON MAGISTRATES AND JURIES, IRISH JURY SYSTEM: FIRST AND SECOND 
REPORTS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON MAGISTRATES AND JURIES WITH MINUTES OF 
EVIDENCE, ETC., 1873, H.C. 283 (abstract available at http://www.bopcris.ac.uk/ 
browse/eppiLCSH/382.html). 
8. SELECT COMM. ON IRISH JURY LAWS, supra note 7, ¶ 14. 
9. Id. ¶ 15. 
10. Id. ¶ 18. 
11. See, for example, Bill for Right Proceedings of Grand Juries in Ireland, on Bills of 
Indictment, 1816, Bill [416]; Bill for Consolidating and Amending Laws Relative to Jurors 
and Juries in Ireland, 1826-1827, Bill [451]; Bill for Consolidating and Amending Laws 
Relative to Jurors and Juries in Ireland, 1828, Bill [98]; Bill for Consolidating and Amending 
Laws Relative to Jurors and Juries in Ireland, 1830, Bill [108]; Bill to Amend Laws Relating 
to Grand Juries in Ireland, 1833, Bill [42]; Bill to Amend Acts for Consolidating and 
Amending Laws Relative to Jurors and Juries in Ireland, 1834, Bill [25]; Bill to Amend 
Common Law Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1853, in Relation to Jurors and Juries in County of 
Cork, 1864, Bill [43]; Bill to Consolidate and Amend Laws Relating to Petit Juries in 
Ireland, 1867, Bill [46]; Act to Amend and Consolidate Laws Relating to Juries in Ireland, 
1871, Bill [231]; Bill to Provide that Jurors in Criminal Trials in Ireland Be Chosen as in 
Civil Trials by Ballot, and to Abolish Power of Crown in such Trials to Set Aside Jurors 
Without Cause, 1872, Bill [47]; Bill to Amend Grand Jury (Ireland) Laws, 1895, Bill [155]; 
Bill to Amend Law Relating to Jurors in Ireland as Relates to County of Cork, 1895, Bill 
[121]; Bill to Amend Juries (Ireland) Acts, 1896, Bill [39]; Bill to Provide for Payment of 
Jurors in Ireland, 1896, Bill [75]. Information on these bills is available at 
http://www.bopcris.ac.uk/browse/eppiLCSH/382.html. 
12. See, e.g., JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE: A TREATISE IN 
COMMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 87-88 (Francis Gregor trans., Cincinnati, Robert 
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bought or brought under undue influence of the defendant.13) The state actively 
sought individuals with a strong character, chosen by a disinterested party; and 
it empanelled individuals whose reputations would be on the line.14 The 
government further tried to counter the risks by imposing penalties for perverse 
verdicts.15 
As political violence continued, the beginning of the twentieth century 
witnessed the partition of the island.16 For the next fifty years unionists 
controlled Northern Ireland. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) launched four 
campaigns to eliminate the border. In each of these the unionist government 
used extra-judicial measures, such as executive detention and restriction orders, 
to address terrorism—reducing concerns about juries by narrowing the role of 
the judiciary.17 
In the late 1960s, violence again erupted. Alarmed at the growing number 
of shootings, incendiary devices, and bombings, Westminster assumed direct 
control of Northern Ireland in 1972. The government immediately instituted a 
review to examine what steps could be taken to reduce violence. 
Lord Diplock, who chaired the inquiry, paid particular attention to the 
state’s tendency to avoid the judicial system by using executive detention 
measures. He suggested that where cases did go to trial, perverse verdicts and 
the potential for juror intimidation undermined the system. Although he offered 
no evidence in support of this claim, he recommended the suspension of jury 
trial.18 The subsequent 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
eliminated juries for trials of offenses associated with terrorist crime.19 
Although the Act was intended as a temporary measure, for more than thirty 
years Britain suspended juries in terrorist trials in Northern Ireland. 
 
Clarke & Co. 1874). 
13. Id. at 88. 
14. Id. at 92-93. 
15. Id. at 92. 
16. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, created one 
parliament for the six northeastern counties and another for the remaining twenty-six. The 
northern parliament formed, but in the south Dáil Éireann rejected the statute. Sinn Féin and 
the Irish Republican Army became increasingly violent. Lloyd George brought leaders from 
both sides of the border to London to re-negotiate the Act. The resulting treaty provided 
Ireland with a degree of independence, while requiring continued allegiance to the Crown. 
The North could decide not to participate in the new Irish structure and instead, through its 
parliament at Stormont, maintain more direct links to Westminster. Within five months, the 
North seceded. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY 
POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1922-2000, at 2-3 (2000). 
17. DONOHUE, supra note 16, at 44. 
18. COMM’N TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND, REPORT, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, ¶ 7(g). 
19. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 2. The government 
also heeded another of Diplock’s recommendations: it eliminated the property qualification 
for British subjects called to service in non-terrorist trials. 
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Successive reviewers of emergency measures recommended changes to the 
legislation,20 but it was not until December 1999, during the Second Reading of 
the Terrorism Bill, that the Home Secretary announced that a Review Group 
would consider and report on what changes could be made to facilitate 
transition back to trial by jury.21 The Review Group had just six months to 
consider the matter. The final report suggested that while general consensus 
existed that Northern Ireland needed to return to jury trial, the time was not yet 
ripe.22 Three material factors would have to be taken into account: the risk of 
juror intimidation, perverse verdicts, and the level of threat.23 
Mr. Adam Ingram, Minister of State for the Northern Ireland Office, 
reiterated in Parliament, “While the Government’s overall objective remains a 
return to jury trial for all offenses in Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State 
agrees with the Review Group’s recommendation that the time is not yet right 
for such a move.”24 Juror intimidation and perverse verdicts, emphasized by 
Lord Diplock nearly three decades before, continued to be a problem. The 
Review Group explained the difference between Northern Ireland and the rest 
of the United Kingdom: 
While organised gangs in Great Britain may pose a serious threat, the problem 
in Northern Ireland is exacerbated by the relatively small community and the 
control the paramilitaries seek to exert over it through intimidation and so-
called punishment beatings and shootings. In a small community people are 
aware of who is on jury service. Paramilitary groups can still exert great 
influence over their communities and until that wanes, people in those 
communities will be potentially open to intimidation.25 
The inquiry compared the situation to witness intimidation and noted that 
“[f]or higher levels of intimidation, the protection that may be necessary is so 
disruptive (i.e. relocation, possible change of identity, long-term protection for 
entire families) that it would be an unrealistically high price to require of 
potential jurors.”26 It recognized that such protections may be “extremely 
resource-intensive.”27 The inquiry cited the importance of building public 
confidence, for as Lord Diplock had observed, “a frightened juror is a bad juror 
even though his own safety and that of his family may not actually be at 
 
20. See, e.g., INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 1996, Cm. 3420, 
¶¶ 16.17, 16.18 (recommending that offenses be certified in, not out of, the Diplock system).  
21. 341 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (Dec. 14, 1999) 166; see also N. IR. OFFICE, 
DIPLOCK REVIEW REPORT 2 (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter REVIEW REPORT]. 
22. REVIEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 2. 
23. Id. at 3. 
24. 354 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (July 18, 2000) 124WS.  
25. REVIEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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risk.”28 In 2000, the state continued juryless courts in Northern Ireland in a 
temporary subsection of permanent legislation.29 
In July 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army declared an end to its 
campaign.30 Within weeks, the British government responded with a program 
for security normalization that upped the ante, proposing the end of the Diplock 
system by July 31, 2007. A year later, the Blair government met further 
progress in the peace process with a consultation paper that recognized the 
“residual risk from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitaries who are still 
engaged in planning acts of terrorism and continue to raise funds for their 
organisations.”31 It echoed Lord Diplock: “People in Northern Ireland . . . live 
in close-knit communities and in some cases these are dominated by members 
of paramilitary organisations. This increases the risk of intimidation. It also 
creates a fear of intimidation that can be just as damaging.”32 Nevertheless, the 
government proposed that the state shift in July 2007 to the presumption of jury 
trial for terrorist offenses. 
Many unionists decried the proposal as an abdication of responsibility: 
violence may have been decreasing in the province, but it was still there. As 
Table 1 shows, since March 2003, there had been 347 shootings, 375 assaults, 
and 18 murders due to political violence.  
 
Table 1. Paramilitary Shootings, Assaults, and Murders (Mar. 2003-Aug. 2006) 
Dates Shootings Assaults Murders 
Mar. 2003-Feb. 2004 157 153 7 
Mar. 2004-Feb. 2005 94 114 4 
Mar. 2005-Feb. 2006 78 81 7 
Mar. 2006-Aug. 2006 [18] [27] [0] 
Totals 347 375 18 
Source: INDEP. MONITORING COMM’N, TWELFTH REPORT, 2006, Cm., at 18-19.  
 
Although violence was on the decline, dissident paramilitary organizations 
appeared to be increasing their criminal activities. Reporting in autumn 2006, 
for instance, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) noted that the 
Continuity IRA was recruiting and training members in engineering and 
firearms.33 Óglaigh na hÉireann, a small dissident group, was gaining 
 
28. Id. 
29. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 75. 
30. IRA Statement in Full, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
uk_news/northern_ireland/4724599.stm. 
31. N. IR. OFFICE, REPLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DIPLOCK COURT SYSTEM: A 
CONSULTATION PAPER ¶ 2.7 (2006) [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER], available at http:// 
www.nio.gov.uk/replacement_arrangements_for_the_diplock_court_system__a_consultation
_paper.pdf. 
32. Id. ¶ 2.8. 
33. INDEP. MONITORING COMM’N, TWELFTH REPORT, 2006, Cm., ¶ 2.8 [hereinafter IMC 
REPORT], available at http://www.independentmonitoringcommission.org/documents/ 
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ground.34 The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) had become “primarily a 
criminal concern.”35 While it lacked “any coherent political purpose,” the LVF 
had moved into drug dealing and criminal activity.36 Similarly, the Real IRA 
(RIRA) continued “to recruit members . . . monitor police officers and stations; 
and [identify] loyalist paramilitaries as potential targets for attack.”37 The IMC 
described the Ulster Defence Association as “an active threat to the rule of 
law”, and the Ulster Volunteer Force, in a similar manner.38 
Not only did paramilitary violence continue, but the judicial system was 
under strain. Police intelligence identified eleven cases of jury tampering in 
non-Diplock courts 1999-2006, seven of which involved individuals with 
paramilitary connections.39 Witness intimidation regularly occurred. (In 2004-
2005, for instance, the Police Service of Northern Ireland recorded seventy-four 
instances of witness intimidation.40 It is estimated that only half of all cases of 
intimidation are reported to the police.41) While not peculiar to Northern 
Ireland, the situation was considerably worse in the province than in the rest of 
the United Kingdom.42 Lord Carlile, the government’s annual reviewer of 
counterterrorist law, reported: 
I am aware of concern in the courts about intimidatory tactics used in the 
presence of juries by the connections of defendants, and of the not uncommon 
failure of prosecution witnesses to turn up at court to give evidence. 
Intimidation can be subtle but disturbing, for example the repeated presence in 
the public gallery of persons looking closely at the faces of jurors.43 
The issues that plagued the judiciary in nineteenth century Ireland continued to 
challenge efforts by the British state in the early twenty-first century to 
establish jury trial for terrorist charges. 
 
uploads/IMC%2012th%20Report%20pdf.pdf. The Independent Monitoring Commission 
began operating in January 2004 to report on the level of paramilitary activity in Northern 
Ireland, the normalization of security measures, and the degree to which political parties in 
the region are upholding their agreements. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
34. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
35. Id. ¶ 2.14. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. ¶ 2.25. 
38. Id. ¶¶ 2.28, 2.35. 
39. Letter from Paul Goggins, Parliamentary Under-Sec’y of State for N. Ir. (Jan. 22, 
2007) (regarding Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/46/4608.htm#a33. But 
see Letter from Lord Carlile of Berriew to Shaun Woodward, Parliamentary Under-Sec’y of 
State for N. Ir. ¶ 10 (Apr. 2006), in CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, annex A (reporting 
four cases of jury tampering in non-Diplock courts in the past seven years). 
40. Letter from Paul Goggins, supra note 39. 
41. Id. 
42. Letter from Lord Carlile of Berriew, supra note 39, ¶ 11. 
43. Id. ¶ 12. 
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2. America under scrutiny 
The concerns highlighted above extend beyond British or Irish borders. 
Where suspected terrorists have stood trial, the United States also has witnessed 
intimidation and politics enter the courtroom through the jury. The infamous 
trial of Bartolomeo Vanzetti and Nicola Sacco,44 two Italian anarchists, proves 
illustrative. Believing jurors and the trial to be a potential target, Massachusetts 
responded by taking a series of public security measures: the police guarded the 
courthouse, and every stranger who entered the courtroom was searched for 
weapons. The judge also went to some lengths to ensure that the weapons on 
exhibit were not loaded.45 Even this did not prevent one of the jurors from 
having a bomb thrown at his house.46 Simultaneously, Fred Moore, the 
California attorney who first defended the two men, turned the trial into a 
political tour de force: he organized public meetings, distributed tens of 
thousands of pamphlets, and drew on international organizations and foreign 
governments to reshape the question of guilt as a political matter—and thus 
influence the jurors’ decisions.47 
Juror bias also proved potentially problematic in United States v. Salameh, 
which dealt with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.48 One defendant 
claimed that his right to fair trial was abridged because the court “failed to ask 
sufficiently probing questions regarding the jury panel’s bias against Muslims, 
Arabs and Islamic Fundamentalism.”49 The trial judge went through 
considerable steps to ensure juror impartiality.50 
 
44. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926). 
45. OSMOND K. FRAENKEL, THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE 16 (1931). 
46. Id. at 3. 
47. Robert D’Attilio, Sacco-Vanzetti Case, http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/88/ 
sacvan.html. The case sharply divided the country and spawned dozens of books. See, e.g., 
COMMONWEALTH VS. SACCO AND VANZETTI (Robert P. Weeks ed., 1958); FRAENKEL, supra 
note 45; FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); BRIAN JACKSON, 
THE BLACK FLAG: A LOOK BACK AT THE STRANGE CASE OF NICOLA SACCO AND 
BARTOLOMEO VANZETTI (1981); ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, SACCO-VANZETTI: THE MURDER 
AND THE MYTH (1960); KATHERINE ANNE PORTER, THE NEVER-ENDING WRONG (1977); THE 
SACCO-VANZETTI CASE: TRANSCRIPT OF THE RECORD OF THE TRIAL OF NICOLA SACCO AND 
BARTOLOMEO VANZETTI IN THE COURTS OF MASSACHUSETTS AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS 
1920-7 (2d ed. 1969); WILLIAM YOUNG & DAVID E. KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE 
IN THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1985). 
48. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). 
49. Id. 
50. Judge Duffy selected the jury in three steps. The first considered potential jurors in 
groups of fifty. The judge explained the charges, read the names, and took petitions for those 
who wanted to be excused. Duffy eliminated anyone who expressed bias or hesitancy: some 
nintey out of 150 potential jurors. The second step placed jurors randomly in five groups of 
twelve. Each group was asked: (1) “If you had to describe your religious views, how would 
you do it?”; (2) “Have you ever had an incident in your life that would make it difficult to 
judge another person because of their race or creed or color or national origin or anything 
like that?”; (3) “Have you ever moved out of an area because you were disturbed that the 
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Similar concern about scapegoating affected the trial of Omar Mohammed 
Ali Rezaq, who was accused of killing Americans during the hijacking of Air 
Egypt Flight 648.51 On July 17, 1996, the night after the government’s closing 
argument, TWA Flight 800 crashed off the coast of New York. Extensive 
media coverage followed. One survey found that it was the most heavily 
covered case in all of 1996.52 The accident was widely believed at the time to 
be the work of terrorists. An article in the Washington Post noted that Athens, 
Flight 800 aircraft’s original departure point, was “known as a base for 
terrorists.”53 This was the same city where Rezaq had boarded Air Egypt Flight 
648. The judge neither sequestered the jury nor instructed them to avoid the 
news. Two days later, the jury issued a verdict of guilty.54 
These cases all took place prior to 9/11. Just over two months after the 
attacks, the Bush Administration announced that juryless military tribunals 
would try noncitizens suspected of complicity in international terrorist attacks 
against the United States.55 Nevertheless, terrorist cases involving citizens and 
noncitizens continued to arise in the domestic criminal court system. And like 
their predecessors, many gave rise to concerns about the role of the jury. 
In 2003, the “Lackwana Six,” for example, were indicted on charges of 
material support to a foreign terrorist organization.56 The magistrate openly 
noted the difficulty of obtaining an impartial trial: “Understandably, the 
infamous, dastardly and tragic deeds and events of September 11, 2001 have 
caused a maelstrom of human emotions to be not only released but to also 
create a human reservoir of strong emotional feelings such as fear, anxiety and 
hatred as well as a feeling of paranoia in many of the hearts and minds of the 
inhabitants of this great nation.”57 He continued, “These are strong emotions of 
a negative nature which, if not appropriately checked, cause the ability of one 
to properly reason to be impeded or to be blinded in applying our basic 
principles of law.”58 Recognizing the emotional atmosphere that accompanies 
 
area was changing?”; and (4) “Do you think that you could be fair and impartial in a case 
like this?” Id. at 120-21. Again, anyone expressing bias was excused. In the third stage, the 
judge questioned potential jurors individually with all counsel present. Duffy emphasized the 
importance of being “totally fair and impartial.” Id. at 121. The judge asked the remaining 
venire candidates whether they had ever traveled to the Middle East, had feelings about 
Israel, or had Muslim friends, colleagues, or business acquaintances. The judge then 
considered counsels’ challenges for cause. After this, peremptory challenges were exercised. 
The appellate court found the voir dire to be “proper and searching.” Id. at 120. 
51. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
52. Id. at 1139. 
53. Don Phillips, 747 Explodes with 229 Aboard Shortly After Takeoff from N.Y.; 
Witnesses Say They Saw Fireball Fall, WASH. POST, July 18, 1996, at A1. 
54. Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1139. 
55. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).  
56. United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 243-44 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 
57. United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
58. Id. 
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terrorist attack, even the defendants’ soccer coach advised them, “Take a plea 
because no jury is going to sympathize with you now.”59 
In another case, Enaam Arnaout, the Director of Benevolence International 
Foundation, pled guilty to funneling charitable contributions to terrorist 
organizations.60 His attorney stated as one motivation for the plea: “One has to 
question whether a fair and impartial jury could be found anywhere in America 
today that could sit in judgment of an Arab-American in a case involving 
allegations of terrorism.”61 
In the case of John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban,” who was due to 
appear before court in the Eastern Division of Virginia, the potential for juror 
bias was considerable: the courthouse was located in the same district as the 
Pentagon and close to Washington, D.C. where an anthrax attack had just 
occurred.62 A local Central Intelligence Agency officer, Johnny “Mike” Spann, 
had been killed just after interviewing Lindh in Afghanistan. With extensive 
coverage of the September 11 attacks and their aftermath and concerns in the 
Washington, D.C. area about the risk of future attacks, Virginia jurors appeared 
to be less sympathetic to Lindh before his trial than jurors elsewhere. One study 
found that 70% of people in Virginia had an unfavorable or very unfavorable 
view of Mr. Lindh, as opposed to 55% in Illinois.63 
Concerns about intimidation, of course, are not limited to terrorist suspects. 
In the 1962 trial of Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa, for instance, the judge 
responded to a hung jury by declaring a mistrial—on the grounds that labor 
associates of Hoffa had attempted to tamper with the jury.64 And politicization 
also occurs outside the terrorist context. Particularly heinous crimes spark the 
same sort of moral outrage and desire to act in accordance with the sense of the 
community. 
But while such concerns may arise in the criminal realm, they are central to 
the nature of terrorist challenge. Nevertheless, such similarities raise two 
important questions: first, to what degree can measures used in the criminal 
context translate to the counterterrorist realm? Second, to what extent should 
counterterrorist changes in court proceedings transfer to criminal law? I return 
to these considerations later. 
 
59. Michael Powell, No Choice but Guilty; Lackawanna Case Highlights Legal Tilt, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A1. 
60. Vidmar, supra note 3, at 1144; see United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
61. Vidmar, supra note 3, at 1144. 
62. Id. at 1156-57. 
63. Id. at 1161. 
64. Hoffa Case Ends with a Mistrial: Judge Orders Investigation into 3 Alleged 
Attempts to Tamper with Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1962, at 1. 
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B. Public Dissemination of Classified Material 
The presence of jurors in the courtroom may alter the amount and type of 
information that the state may be able to reveal. Where national security is on 
the line, the state may be unwilling to show intelligence methods and sources to 
the public. Jurors generally do not hold security clearances. And where 
terrorism has been present for some time, the state may be particularly 
concerned about jurors providing information—either wittingly or 
unwittingly—to terrorist groups. 
The British government took this concern directly on board in its 1978 
guidelines for jury vetting. Where “(a) . . . strong political motives were 
involved such as [in] I.R.A. and other terrorist cases and cases under the 
Official Secrets Acts,” and “(b) [s]erious offences [were] alleged to have been 
committed by a person or persons believed to belong to a gang of professional 
criminals,”65 the state could ask potential jurors to “stand by”—essentially, to 
go to the end of the line and be considered only after other potential jurors had 
either been empanelled or dismissed.66 The government explained, “In these 
cases the circumstances may indicate that potential jurors may be susceptible to 
improper pressure or may, because of extreme political beliefs be biased 
against either the prosecution or the defence.”67 It emphasized 
that a juror’s political connections are wholly irrelevant unless they are of so 
extreme a character as to make it reasonably likely that they will prevent the 
juror from trying a case fairly or that he may exert improper pressure on his 
fellow jurors. In Official Secrets cases there is the additional factor that it may 
be anticipated that some of the evidence will be heard in camera, when the 
possibility of a potential juror making improper use of that evidence, 
voluntarily or under pressure, may need to be borne in mind.68 
 Another mechanism available to the state to allow it to use confidential 
information at trial is a Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate, which allows 
a minister to approve the use of information and suspend cross-examination of 
the witness. The purpose is to prevent the public from learning about 
intelligence methods—such as the structure or extent of surveillance 
operations—that could then be used against the state. (For the same reason, and 
to protect the United Kingdom’s ability to procure intelligence from other 
countries, the Home Office severely restricts the use of intercept evidence in 
the courtroom).69 There is an informal check on this power: political costs 
 
65. R v. Sheffield Crown Court, (1980) 71 Crim. App. 19, 30 (Q.B.) (setting forth the 
government’s guidelines on jury checks as an appendix to the opinion, not included in the 
official Queen’s Bench reporter, cited infra note 109).  
66. Id. Note that these guidelines appear to apply only to England and not to Northern 
Ireland, as the legislation to which they refer is solely English.  
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added). 
69. COMM. OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE INTERCEPTION OF 
COMMC’NS, REPORT, 1957, Cmnd. 283, ¶ 90, available at http://fipr.org/rip/Birkett.htm. 
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accrue for the minister who signs the PII certificate, known in Parliament as a 
“gag” device, for seeming to hide the source of evidence.70 
Concern about intelligence information being made available to the jury is 
not unique to the United Kingdom; nor is it only of issue where conflicts have 
long been entrenched. A similar concern appears to have played a role in the 
United States at the recent trial of Zaccharias Moussaoui, the “20th hijacker.”71 
The government sought to block Moussaoui’s efforts to obtain confidential 
documents and access to certain al Qaeda suspects held at Guantánamo Bay. 
Judge Leonie Brinkema denied Moussaoui’s motion to obtain the materials, but 
then allowed him to use prisoners held at the Cuban base as witnesses in his 
defense.72 As the trial judge’s rulings in the Moussaoui case made clear, 
though, government efforts to withhold evidence can endanger the state’s 
ability to prosecute terrorist crimes. Like the PII certificate, it also can carry 
political costs.  
In sum, potential juror intimidation, politicization of juries, and public 
dissemination of classified material raise concerns about the role of juries in 
terrorist trials. The balance of this essay considers ways to address these 
concerns. The suspension of juries for terrorist trials provides one solution. The 
following Part considers the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. 
II. JURY SUSPENSION 
In 1973, the United Kingdom responded to political violence by 
suspending jury trial. Single-judge courts had the advantage of emphasizing the 
rule of law and the role of the judiciary. They neutralized the risk posed to 
jurors, and they provided a clean start while eliminating jurors’ biases from the 
equation. The system incorporated important safeguards—requiring judges to 
indicate the grounds on which they determined the guilt or innocence of the 
accused and allowing an automatic right of appeal based on law or fact. It 
proved flexible enough to alter over time to address deficiencies, and it may 
well have saved valuable resources when the state needed funds for other 
important security needs. 
But the Diplock courts also carried important disadvantages: they clashed 
with Britain’s traditional embrace of trial by jury, and they eliminated one of 
the only ways the minority Catholic community could participate in the 
administration of justice. Simultaneous changes in admissibility of confessions 
 
70. Interview with a senior British civil servant in Stanford, Cal. (Nov. 3, 2006). 
Information provided to the author upon the condition of anonymity. 
71. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (second appellate 
decision); United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (first appellate 
decision); United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (lower court 
decision sanctioning government for failing to allow the defendant to depose one of the 
government witnesses). 
72. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480. 
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and rules of evidence raised questions about whether the system was designed 
to convict individuals—not to dispense justice. The new courts hurt the United 
Kingdom’s international standing. And the changes did not remain insulated 
from the ordinary criminal realm. 
American military commissions also suspended jury trial for terrorist 
offenses. Their use stemmed in some measure from framing of the fight against 
al Qaeda as “war” (and thus implying the suitability of using military, not 
civilian, structures in response). The creation of these tribunals gave the Bush 
Administration a significant amount of control over the trial process. It 
eliminated the potential for intimidation. Classified information could be 
admitted as evidence. And the risks of jury nullification disappeared. Where 
individuals could be plotting attacks involving massive destruction, narrowing 
the possibility of the guilty going free reduced the risk to the state. 
However, like the Diplock courts, military commissions had important 
weaknesses. The Administration had not made the case that the civilian courts 
were inadequate to handle those accused of complicity in September 11, 2001. 
The decision to bypass juries hit at the heart of their nature as a political 
institution, in which capacity they provide an important counter to acts of 
terror. The exclusion of jurors meant that the democratic nature of serving as a 
juror was lost, even though a better popular understanding of the threat faced 
would have helped the state in its counterterrorist program. Juries also provide 
an important check on the majoritarian nature of counterterrorist law. 
International disapproval of the military commissions carried additional 
consequences. 
A. The Case of Northern Ireland 
The Diplock courts in Northern Ireland had a number of advantages. First 
and foremost, they emphasized rule of law and the role of the judiciary in 
stemming violence. Internment, a purely executive procedure, had been a 
disaster: on August 9, 1971, Operation Demetrius resulted in the imprisonment, 
without charge, of hundreds of Catholics in Northern Ireland—many of whom 
had no involvement with paramilitary organizations.73 Violence in the province 
exploded. In the four months preceding internment, eight people died from 
troubles-related violence. In the subsequent four months, 114 individuals were 
killed.74 From seventy-eight explosions in July 1971, the number jumped in 
August to 131, followed in September by 196.75  
As a practical matter, the shift to single-judge courts helped to prevent 
known terrorists from walking free—diminishing the level of violence in the 
 
73. DONOHUE, supra note 16, at 118. 
74. Charles Carlton, Judging Without Consensus: The Diplock Courts in Northern 
Ireland, 3 LAW & POL’Y Q. 225, 229 (1981). 
75. DONOHUE, supra note 16, at 118. 
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province and bolstering citizens’ belief in the state’s ability to protect them. 
Indeed, after the courts’ introduction, violence fell.76 And as intended, 
convictions increased: in the first five years, murder convictions rose from nine 
to seventy-seven; wounding convictions from 142 to 499; and robbery 
convictions from 791 to 1836.77 At a time when the legitimacy of the state was 
under attack, it was important for the government to be able to take affirmative 
and visible steps showing enhanced security. As a structural matter, the shift 
from internment to the Diplock court system meant that individuals would not 
lose their freedom at the say-so of a politician, but as a result of a deliberative, 
judicial process.  
Beyond reinforcing the judicial role in countering terrorism, the reforms 
neutralized the risk posed to jurors by eliminating them from the system. 
Northern Ireland was, and remains, an extremely close-knit society. The 
paramilitaries held a strong grip on some local areas. Many alternative 
solutions—such as masking the identity of the jurors—were implausible. Jurors 
would have to make the journey to and from court, where they would be seen. 
As soon as one juror became known to a paramilitary organization, the group 
could use its coercive powers—threatening the juror or the juror’s family 
members—to identify others. As violence became part of daily life, eliminating 
jurors relieved some of the burden borne by the citizens. 
Simultaneously, the sudden shift signaled a break with the past and 
suggested a fresh start, while removing juror bias from consideration. Popular 
perception considered the judicial system as skewed against Catholics. 
Statistics supported this view. A study by Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard in 
1973, for instance, found that in political cases, the courts denied bail to 79% of 
the Catholics who came before it, but only 54% of the Protestants.78 Juries, in 
turn, acquitted approximately 15% of Protestant defendants compared to only 
5% of Catholics.79 Internment had been intended to get around the problems 
with the courts. But it had failed. The creation of a new system suggested not a 
return to the discrepancies of the past, but the beginning of more equitable 
adjudication. 
The system carried other important benefits as well. To retain the 
adversarial nature of the proceedings, Diplock judges were required to spell out 
both the factual and legal basis of their decisions. Defendants, in addition, were 
granted an automatic right of appeal. Matters of either fact or law could be 
reviewed.  
These changes subjected decisions to greater scrutiny and allowed counsel 
to challenge the basis of the judgments. The written findings required a high 
 
76. Carlton, supra note 74, at 233.  
77. Id. at 234. 
78. TOM HADDEN & PADDY HILLYARD, JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A STUDY IN 
SOCIAL CONFIDENCE 48 tbl.5.2 (1973). 
79. Id. at 55 tbl.5.6; see also Carlton, supra note 74, at 235.  
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level of discipline in the fact-finding phase of the trial: defendants tended to 
appeal Diplock convictions more frequently than jury convictions—most likely 
due to the requirement that the judges write out their findings, making it easier 
to challenge the conclusion.80 Judges, in turn, proved sensitive to potential 
reversals and consequently went to some lengths to ensure the strength of their 
information.81 This offered more protection to defendants than jury verdicts 
would have—the latter being returned without explanation and in relation to 
which no automatic right of appeal existed. 
The system simultaneously allowed for reform to address deficiencies. To 
avoid being placed in the position of having to instruct themselves to disregard 
inadmissible evidence, for instance, judges informally began vetting evidence 
for each other. A few years after the Diplock courts’ introduction, the state 
began to keep more extensive statistics on the operation of the system, and 
frequent inquiries and reviews kept the matter under advisement. 
The decision to move to single-judge courts also may have lowered the 
costs of prosecution: the state would not have to provide security measures for 
twelve more people. Instead, it could focus its resources on the judiciary itself. 
A contrary argument could be made that other characteristics of the system, 
such as the automatic right to appeal, increased costs. But in the absence of 
more concrete data, speculation remains just that. 
The elimination of the defendant’s peers from the courtroom—done 
without evidence of the need to do so—also carried with it important 
weaknesses. Perhaps most dramatically, the system clashed with Britain’s 
traditional embrace of jury trial, which legend—if not history—rooted in one of 
the state’s foundation documents: the Magna Carta. Jury trial, celebrated by 
writers such as Blackstone, symbolized England’s embrace of liberty rights.82 
Although Lord Diplock squarely addressed this issue, stating that jury trial was 
not a fundamental right, giving up juries did weaken state legitimacy at a time 
when it was under attack. In doing so, it appeared that a different standard 
 
80. JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 276-86 (1995); see also Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland’s 
Criminal Trials Without Jury: The Diplock Experiment, 5 ANN. SURV. IN’L & COMP. L. 239, 
253 (1999). Appeals courts did draw limits—for instance, judges were not required to 
indicate the relative weight of the factors considered in the judgment, but this did not mean 
that the information relied upon or the manner in which the judge relied upon it escaped 
scrutiny. R v. Caraher, [2000] NICC 3072, [6] (N. Ir.) (citing R v. Thain, [1985] 11 NIJB 31, 
[60] (N. Ir.)). But where the trial judge relied upon a “defective” or “erroneous finding,” the 
court treated the situation as “broadly akin to a misdirection of fact by a trial judge to a 
jury.” Id. (citing R v. Gibson, [1986] NIJB 1, [29] (N. Ir.)). It asked “whether the jury would 
inevitably have convicted if the summing-up had not contained the misdirection.” Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
81. John D. Jackson, The Restoration of Jury Trial in Northern Ireland: Can We Learn 
from the Professional Alternative?, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 15. 
82. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349 (calling the jury the 
“grand bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liberties”). 
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existed for Northern Ireland than for Great Britain, playing into an old 
grievance in the province. 
Jury suspension also prevented the minority Catholic community from 
engaging in the administration of justice. Judges at the time came almost 
entirely from the majority Protestant community. Even as late as 1976, 
Protestants held sixty-eight of the seventy-four senior court appointments.83 
The disparity was exacerbated by republican insistence that nationalists not 
“buy in” to the British system by participating in a meaningful way in the 
operation of the courts. In the wake of fifty years of unionist rule, in which the 
minority community had systematically been discriminated against, attempts to 
overcome the barriers may have seemed futile. Substantial social and economic 
barriers also played a role in diminishing the number of Catholics who worked 
as solicitors. The jury, then, provided an important instrument in engaging the 
minority community in the administration of justice. Eliminating it took away 
an opportunity for the state to bypass formal mechanisms and engage directly 
with individuals in the province. 
The simultaneous weakening of voir dire (referring in the British context to 
the admissibility of confessions) and relaxed evidentiary rules bolstered 
dissidents’ claims against the government. The state began to allow inferences 
to be drawn from silence, and police testimony became sufficient to find 
membership in proscribed organizations.84 The combination of these changes 
may have contributed to miscarriages of justice, further eroding public 
confidence in the system, and making it seem as though the state was trying to 
“load the deck” against (primarily minority community) defendants. 
The single-judge courts also hurt the state’s international standing—and its 
ability to conduct foreign affairs. In the mid-1980s, for instance, the existence 
of the Diplock tribunals and the continued refusal of the British government to 
restore jury trial nearly prevented the Republic of Ireland from signing an 
extradition treaty.85 Such effects can be serious: in the case of extradition, the 
state’s inability to obtain suspects, particularly from a neighboring territory, 
increases the potential level of violence. 
The shift to single-judge courts in the counterterrorist realm, moreover, did 
not remain isolated from ordinary criminal law. The transfer happened in two 
ways. First, the broad range of scheduled offenses that automatically fell under 
the Diplock system meant that many non-terrorist cases, where no risk of juror 
 
83. Carlton, supra note 74, at 227. 
84. See The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, 1988, SI 1998/1987 (N. Ir. 
20), art. 3; Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, c. 40. 
85. See, e.g., Hugh Carnegy, Irish Plea on Diplock Courts Refused, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Nov. 6, 1986, at 9; King Issues Warning to Dublin on Extradition Bill, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Oct. 22, 1987, at 48; Rebuff for Irish on Diplock, TIMES (London), Nov. 6, 1986; 
Sarah Spencer & Fran Russell, Agenda: Breaking the Diplock–A Three-Judge System, 
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 17, 1987. 
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intimidation existed, came before the courts. By the mid-1980s, some 40% of 
Diplock cases bore no relationship to paramilitary activity. 
Eventually, this problem did abate. In 1986, Westminster responded to 
calls to end the system by expanding the number of scheduled crimes that could 
be certified out—that is, sent to non-Diplock courts. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions accordingly began increasing the number of cases that went to 
jury trial. (The Attorney General would only deschedule a case where he was 
“satisfied that it is not connected with the emergency in Northern Ireland.”)86 
By October 2006, some 85-90% of the cases were being descheduled.87 
The second way in which the tribunals were brought into criminal law was 
even more direct: even as efforts were made to restore juries in Northern 
Ireland in the early twenty-first century, the government began calling for the 
suspension of jury trial for ordinary criminal law, where particularly complex 
information or long trials existed.88 
In 2003, the Criminal Justice Act cemented this shift, providing for the 
creation of single-judge tribunals throughout England and Wales for cases 
involving complex fraud or where a significantly high danger of jury tampering 
exists.89 In the latter instance, the prosecution applies to a judge of the Crown 
Court, who must be satisfied “that there is evidence of a real and present danger 
that jury tampering would take place” and that “notwithstanding any steps 
(including the provision of police protection) which might reasonably be taken 
to prevent jury tampering, the likelihood that it would take place would be so 
substantial as to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be 
conducted without a jury.”90 The statute offers a handful of examples: retrials 
where the previous jury was discharged because of jury tampering; situations 
where defendants have previously been part of proceedings where such efforts 
had occurred; or cases where actual or attempted intimidation of witnesses had 
occurred.91 
Although the House of Commons approved the non-jury provisions of the 
legislation, the House of Lords balked at the suspension of juries. The 
Conservative peer Lord Hunt of Wirral protested that simplifying the law on 
fraud would be preferable to eliminating juries altogether.92 Liberal Democratic 
spokesperson Lord Thomas of Gresford noted that the rate of conviction in 
 
86. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶ 2.2. 
87. Id. ¶ 2.5 (noting also that approximately sixty cases returned for trial without jury, 
as opposed to 329 in 1986). 
88. U.K. HOME OFFICE, JURIES IN SERIOUS FRAUD TRIALS: A CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT ¶ 3.18 (1998), available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERO/records/ 
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89. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 43(2), (5). The Lord Chief Justice, or a judge 
nominated by him, has to agree. Id. § 43(4). 
90. Id. § 44(4), (5). 
91. Id. § 44(6). 
92. 651 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) (July 15, 2003) 773.  
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fraud trials was between 83% and 87%—hardly evidence that the system was 
not working.93 Labour peer Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws suggested that the 
jury “protects the judiciary. It is what maintains the esteem of the British 
judiciary.”94 “Trial by a single judge,” she continued, “catapults judges into a 
position which makes them very vulnerable.”95 She tackled class concerns: 
“white collared professionals” would be “tried by other white collared 
professionals. How will ordinary citizens, excluded from the process, feel about 
acquittals in those circumstances?”96 Other objections, such as compatibility 
with provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights regarding 
discrimination, also surfaced. 
To secure the Lords’ agreement, David Blunkett, then Home Secretary, 
negotiated a compromise: section 43 would only come into force in accordance 
with provisions made by the Secretary of State.97 The Lords agreed and passed 
the Criminal Justice Act. Two years later, the government brought forward a 
draft commencement order to bring section 43 into force. The House of 
Commons Standing Committee approved it. But the House of Lords resisted. 
When it became evident that the order would not pass the second chamber, the 
government withdrew it. 
In November 2006, the government found a way around the Lords’ 
objections by reneging on the earlier deal. It introduced legislation that would 
remove any requirement that the government obtain the Lords’ approval.98 The 
Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill allowed for section 43 to be implemented 
solely by the Secretary of State—not agreement by both Houses, under the 
affirmative procedure. This bill currently is in committee. 
These provisions, it is important to note, are not intended to replace the 
Diplock procedure, but rather to introduce a similar mechanism into the realm 
of other serious crime. The government claimed in its July 2002 white paper, 
“We do not expect there to be more than 15-20 such trials a year and we expect 
their length to reduce as a result.”99 
B. The United States 
The United States has pursued a number of terrorist cases—including some 
against Islamist defendants—through the ordinary court system. Prior to 
September 11, for instance, the government successfully prosecuted twenty-six 
 
93. Id. at 776.  
94. Id. at 780.  
95. Id.  
96. Id. at 781.  
97. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 330(5)(b). 
98. Fraud (Trials Without a Jury) Bill, 2006, [Bill 6]. 
99. U.K. HOME DEP’T, JUSTICE FOR ALL, 2002, Cm. 5563, ¶ 4.30, available at 
http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm55/5563/5563.pdf. 
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jihad conspirators in the Southern District of New York.100 Nevertheless, the 
Bush Administration followed the attacks with the announcement that 
noncitizens apprehended in the “Global War on Terror” and moved to 
Guantànamo Bay would be tried by military tribunal. The logic was that the 
United States found itself embroiled in war—and in war, the military, not the 
civilian courts, provided the appropriate forum for trying the enemy. 
To date, much of the discussion in the United States about Guantànamo 
Bay has centered on liberty and security concerns, with substantially less 
emphasis on the trial process itself—and almost no consideration of the 
implications of not involving juries in the process. While perhaps a secondary 
consideration, the absence of jurors warrants discussion. 
Military commissions offered the Administration a number of advantages. 
The commissions mitigated the first danger raised in this Article—the potential 
for juror intimidation. Not only did they accomplish this by eliminating jurors 
altogether, but an argument could be made that the military officers presiding, 
trained in self-defense and active combat—and already working in high-risk 
occupations—were particularly resistant to intimidation. A small group of 
military personnel, moreover, would be easier to protect from possible 
retaliation than a larger and more diverse group of jurors.  
Military commissions also resolved the third danger identified in this 
Article: the publicization of secret methods of intelligence gathering. Instead of 
being aired in a public forum, classified information could be handled by using 
military judges with security clearances.  
The elimination of jurors also gave the Administration considerable control 
over the trial process and reduced the risk that individuals determined to harm 
the United States would be set free. Concern here may have stemmed from the 
complex set of rules built into the ordinary criminal process. The commissions 
could, for instance, create new rules for the treatment of evidence—which 
would give the court access to information that otherwise might have been 
excluded under ordinary criminal procedure. The use of the special tribunals 
also eliminated the possibility of juror nullification. The Administration was 
recasting its interrogation standards.101 There may have been concern that 
jurors who heard about the techniques being used might nullify the 
proceedings. And where massive attacks using conventional techniques, or 
operations drawing on biological weapons or nuclear material loomed as 
threats, taking a chance with the ordinary criminal process—which might 
acquit the guilty—might have presented too great a risk.  
Finally, as a purely legal matter, there were minimal constitutional 
concerns about excluding juries from a military forum: trials by military 
commission of offenses against the laws of war are not subject to the 
 
100. See United States v. Bin Laden, 160 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
101. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).  
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constitutional requirement of trial by jury.102 Similarly, courts-martial are not 
governed by the procedures of the Sixth Amendment.103 
Setting aside the arguments in support of eliminating juries for cases 
connected to the “Global War on Terror,” the decision also carried important 
weaknesses, many of which have not been aired.  
First, the case against using civilian courts because of concern about juror 
intimidation had not been made. Granted, the September 11 attacks were 
executed on American soil, and threatening in nothing if not their sheer size. 
But the personalized nature of violence in Northern Ireland was not mirrored by 
al Qaeda’s actions within U.S. bounds. Lord Diplock too failed to present 
evidence of intimidation; however, the strong paramilitary hold over local 
communities in Northern Ireland provided some evidence of the concern. In 
contrast, al Qaeda did not exert substantial, personalized control over any 
region in the United States. 
Second, while a stronger argument could be made about the politicization 
of jurors—specifically, the risk that jurors would engage in scapegoating—the 
state at no point made this argument. Indeed, the state itself appeared 
politicized. It had detained more than 1200 individuals within U.S. bounds 
simply by nature of their nationality, age, and religion. Thousands more had 
been detained outside the United States. The rules of the newly minted military 
commissions allowed secret evidence, information obtained under duress, 
hearsay, and a two-thirds vote of the panel to convict. It took more than two 
years from when the President announced that detainees would be tried for the 
first detainee to be granted legal representation. 
Third, the presence of jurors may help to counteract the majoritarian 
tendency of counterterrorist law. That is, counterterrorist measures often 
disproportionately affect minorities. Citizens in the majority may be more 
willing to acquiesce when not confronted with the impact of such laws. 
Preserving jury trials may thus personalize the institutionalized racism that is 
typical of counterterrorist provisions. Relatedly, jurors’ presence—and the 
power to nullify or to find the defendant innocent—may help to keep the state 
in check. The jury here acts as a political force. As one commentator noted, 
“Ordinary jurors can thwart the power of the judiciary in ways that procedures 
guaranteed by other individual rights cannot. Federal judicial oversight of state 
criminal prosecutions threatened state autonomy from without, but jury rights, 
like voting rights, threatened state power from within.”104 Efforts by the 
prosecutor to find a scapegoat—or attempts by the prosecution to use 
 
102. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942).  
103. Wright v. Markley, 351 F.2d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 1965); De War v. Hunter, 170 
F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 908 (1949); Reilly v. Pescor, 156 F.2d 
632, 635 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790 (1946). 
104. Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the 
Federal Regulation of State Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 261, 293 (Carol S. 
Steiker ed., 2006).  
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questionable (or morally repugnant) interrogation techniques—may fall afoul 
of citizens’ views of appropriate countermeasures.  
Fourth, the international, presentational value of eliminating jurors from 
the court room mattered. As other countries looked at the decision of the United 
States to convict individuals through wholly executive action, the state’s claim 
to adhere to the rule of law, as understood in liberal, democratic dialogue, came 
under strain.  
A “double deficit” could be said to follow: the United States depends on 
other countries for extradition, intelligence, and operational support for the 
“Global War on Terror.” The decision to eliminate jurors contributed to other 
states’ reluctance to cooperate with the United States. In 2003, for example, 
Germany delayed extradition of two al Qaeda suspects, Sheik Muhammad Ali 
Hassan al-Mouyad and Muhammad Moshen Yahya Zayed.105 Germany had 
required the United States’s assurance that the two would not be tried by a 
military tribunal.106 
The country’s ability to pursue one of its stated goals—convincing other 
states to adopt a similar political model—also suffered. When the country is 
trying to convince regions to adopt liberal, democratic regimes, suddenly 
eliminating one of the mainstays of such a political structure could lead others 
to question how solidly liberal, democratic government protects individuals 
from unilateral, executive power. Wrapped tightly to this concern was the 
United States’s global leadership on individual rights—and its ability to pursue 
its other foreign policy objectives. Eliminating juries and creating military 
commissions also ran the risk of American citizens and officials being given 
fewer protections in judicial proceedings abroad.107 
Keeping these concerns in mind, the question that presents itself is whether 
the dangers raised at terrorist trials by the presence of jurors could be mitigated 
in ways that stop short of eliminating juries altogether. Here I focus not on 
military courts but on the criminal justice systems in Northern Ireland, Great 
Britain, and the United States—all jurisdictions that will have to grapple with 
terrorist trials in the foreseeable future. 
III. POTENTIAL WAYS TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS RAISED BY TERRORISM 
The most promising adjustments that can be made to address the risks 
raised in Part I of this Article lie in the realm of juror selection. But just as in 
considering the suspension of jury trial, differences between the unique 
 
105. Mark Landler, World Briefing Europe: Germany: Delay in Extradition Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003, at A2. 
106. Id.  
107. This point is not to be drawn too strongly. Many states did continue to cooperate 
with the United States without being public about it. It also is difficult to separate the 
exclusion of the jury from other concerns states may have about the manner in which the 
United States was pursuing its “Global War on Terror.”  
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circumstances of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States need to 
be taken into account. In the British Isles, a strong cultural bias against 
collecting information on jurors’ backgrounds—and using peremptory or for-
cause challenges—exists. American culture, in contrast, appears to have little 
compunction about examining jurors’ backgrounds during voir dire. 
Nevertheless, prosecutors in the United Kingdom can draw from intelligence 
files to determine in national security cases whether to ask certain jurors to 
stand by. Juror qualifications also differ: in Northern Ireland, the best approach 
may be to widen the number of occupations that can be called for jury service. 
In the United States, a more effective approach may center on efforts to obtain 
a change in venue or to masque juror identity. In addition, this Part explores the 
use of alternate jurors. It suggests that a new system, which allows for selection 
of a significant number of alternates, with the final jury chosen by lot 
immediately before deliberations, may lower the risks of jury tampering. 
All of the above deal with juror selection. Alternatively, constraints placed 
on jurors are amongst the least effective ways to address the risks associated 
with terrorist trials. Discharging juries or directing verdicts may be helpful in 
extreme cases, but reliance on them would be misplaced. The possibility of 
obtaining special security clearances for jurors deserves further attention. 
The final realm considered in Part III centers on fixes to the trial procedure 
itself. Changes in this area may prove to be particularly controversial—and the 
hardest to insulate from general criminal law. 
A. Juror Selection 
The selection of jurors offers the best opportunity for the prosecution or 
defense to mitigate the risks highlighted in Part I. This Part considers five 
mechanisms that may be particularly helpful in this regard: collecting juror 
information, relaxing juror qualifications, expanding the region from which 
jurors are drawn, moving the trial to a different venue, and using alternate 
jurors. 
1. Collection of information on jurors 
One way to address the risks of jury trial is to dismiss jurors who may 
prove particularly susceptible to terrorist intimidation, who may show a 
particular bias, or who may be particularly untrustworthy with regard to 
sensitive information. To screen potential jurors, information that would 
indicate these risks has to be made available either to the prosecution or the 
defense, or possibly to both. In the United Kingdom, however, unlike in the 
United States, there is a strong cultural bias against this approach. 
  
March 2007] TERRORISM AND TRIAL BY JURY 1345 
a. British vs. American cultures of juror selection 
In the United Kingdom, the right to an impartial jury does not mean a panel 
designed to be impartial, but one drawn by chance from the citizenry. The 1965 
Report of the Departmental Committee on Jury Service reasoned, “A jury 
should represent a cross-section drawn at random from the community, and 
should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues the corporate good sense 
of that community.”108 As Lord Denning explained, “Our philosophy is that the 
jury should be selected at random—from a panel of persons who are nominated 
at random. We believe that 12 persons selected at random are likely to be a 
cross-section of the people as a whole—and thus represent the views of the 
common man.”109 
This means that the United Kingdom does not make use of extensive 
questionnaires regarding jurors’ backgrounds. Neither does it make such 
extensive use of peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. The latter are 
only rarely exercised. In regard to the former, in England and Wales, the 1988 
Criminal Justice Act abolished peremptory challenges altogether.110 
Northern Ireland works according to a different set of rules. There, 
defendants can challenge up to twelve jurors without showing cause. The 
prosecution, however, can only challenge for cause.111 In both Britain and 
Northern Ireland, however, the Crown can ask jurors to stand by.112 This 
power, discussed earlier in this Article, was used at least from 1948 forward 
(although until 1978 it occurred in secret).113 When no other jurors are left, 
under extraordinary circumstances the state can refuse to call the remaining 
jurors. In England and Wales, the decision to stand by is carefully controlled: it 
must first be authorized by the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP). The DPP 
must then report to the Attorney General any instance in which standing by has 
been authorized. Even this is controversial. Lord Denning opined in obiter 
dicta, 
 
108. DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON JURY SERV., REPORT, 1965, Cmnd. 2627, ¶ 53. There 
are qualifications on the British preference for an indiscriminate sample of citizens: until the 
early 1970s, for instance, property qualifications “excluded many women, lower social class 
and young people.” Robert J. East, “Jury Packing: A Thing of the Past?,” 48 MOD. L. REV. 
518, 520 (1985) (quoting BOB ROSHIER & HARVEY TEFF, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 126 
(1980)). 
109. R v. Sheffield Crown Court, [1980] Q.B. 530, 541. But note that in the case of the 
“UDR Four” (Ulster Defence Regiment Four), prospective jurors were asked whether they 
had any close relatives who were or had been a member of the UDR. Telephone interview 
with a senior Northern Ireland civil servant in Stanford, Cal. (Nov. 20, 2006). Information 
provided to the author upon the condition of anonymity. 
110. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng.). 
111. The Juries (Northern Ireland) Order, 1996, SI 1996/1141 (N. Ir. 6), ¶ 15(2). 
112. Id. ¶ 15(4). 
113. East, supra note 108, at 520. 
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To my mind it is unconstitutional for the police authorities to engage in “jury 
vetting.” So long as a person is eligible for jury service, and is not 
disqualified, I cannot think it right that, behind his back, the police should go 
through his record so as to enable him to be asked to “stand by for the 
Crown,” or to be challenged by the defence. If this sort of thing is to be 
allowed, what comes of a man’s right of privacy? He is bound to serve on a 
jury when summoned. Is he thereby liable to have his past record raked up 
against him—and presented on a plate to prosecuting and defending lawyers— 
who may use it to keep him out of the jury—and, who knows, it may become 
known to his neighbours and those about him?114 
In R v. Mason, British courts formally rejected Denning’s position, saying 
that some jury vetting is necessary to ensure that individuals who are 
disqualified because of their past convictions are indeed excluded.115 Lord 
Justice Lawton explained, “The practice of supplying prosecuting counsel with 
information about potential jurors’ convictions has been followed during the 
whole of our professional lives, and almost certainly for generations before us. 
It is not unlawful, and has not until recently been thought to be 
unsatisfactory.”116 In accordance with Mason, in 1980 the Attorney General 
issued guidelines that limited the type of information that could be provided to 
the prosecution on the past criminal record of potential jurors. 
With this said, however, special rules about gathering information on jurors 
may apply for terrorism or national security trials. British law allows 
prosecutors to obtain intelligence on jurors from law enforcement agencies. 
The Attorney General Guidelines explain that “in security cases [there is] a 
danger that a juror, either voluntarily or under pressure, may make an improper 
use of evidence which, because of its sensitivity, has been given in camera.”117 
The guidelines further state that  
in both security and terrorist cases [there is] the danger that the juror’s 
political beliefs are so biased as to go beyond normally reflecting the broad 
spectrum of views and interests in the community to reflect the extreme views 
of a sectarian or pressure group to a degree which might interfere with his fair 
assessment of the facts of the case or lead him to exert improper pressure on 
his fellow jurors.118  
There is no duty to disclose to the defense when such an inquiry has been 
conducted.119 
 
114. Sheffield Crown Court, [1980] Q.B. at 542.  
115. R v. Mason, [1981] Q.B. 881. 
116. Id. at 891. The court was careful though not to comment beyond this issue, on the 
provision of other information (not related to the past criminal records of potential jurors) to 
the prosecution. 
117. East, supra note 108, at 526 (quoting the 1980 Attorney General Guidelines para. 
5) (alteration in original).  
118. Id. (quoting the 1980 Attorney General Guidelines para. 5) (alteration in original). 
119. Id. at 527. 
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Both as a general matter and in relation to such special circumstances, the 
United Kingdom’s practice in relation to juror selection runs contrary to that of 
the United States, where more influence is given up front to the state and to the 
defense in ensuring an impartial panel of jurors.120 The court is allowed to 
examine prospective jurors and may permit the attorneys on both sides to do so 
as well.121 This may include the use of extensive juror questionnaires.122 In 
capital cases tried in federal court, each side can exercise twenty peremptory 
challenges. In other federal felony cases, the government can exercise six 
challenges, with the defendant or joint defendants retaining ten peremptory 
challenges if possible punishment exceeds one year in prison.123 Even in 
misdemeanor cases, each side is allowed three peremptory challenges.124 
Again, in contrast to the United Kingdom, the United States has no special 
provision for prosecutors to obtain intelligence files on potential jurors. 
b. Considerations for terrorist trials 
The difference between the two states’ approach to juror selection makes it 
difficult—indeed, unwise—to suggest that one particular approach should 
dominate. Instead, the strengths and weaknesses of each system must be 
evaluated within their own context. 
In regard to the United Kingdom, the practice is moving away from 
peremptory challenges. Their continued retention in Northern Ireland can be 
attributed to a lack of pressure to change the system. But there are increasing 
calls to eliminate them, bringing Northern Ireland in line with England and 
Wales.125 The concern is that defendants can use peremptory challenges to 
“pack a jury” with individuals from the same political or religious affiliation. 
If the aim is to create an even playing field and to ensure a random 
selection of jurors, it makes little sense to abolish this right for the defense—
while maintaining the Crown’s ability to stand by. Some restrictions on both 
parties’ ability either to issue peremptory challenges or to stand by potential 
jurors, however, may go some way towards meeting the concern.126 Such steps 
may help to prevent defendants from being able to load a jury in their favor, 
while allowing them to address the very real sectarian divide in the province. 
On the other side, the Attorney General Guidelines in the United Kingdom 
 
120. Compare R v. Sheffield Crown Court, [1980] Q.B. 530, 541, with FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 24. 
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). 
122. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of S.C., Standard Juror Questionnaire, 
available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/docs/juryques.pdf. 
123. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1)-(2). 
124. Id. R. 24(b)(3). 
125. See, e.g., CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶¶ 3.3, 3.11-3.13. 
126. Id. ¶¶ 3.3, 3.14-3.16. 
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provide a good example of clearly defined and restricted conditions under 
which stand by could be given effect.127 
The questions that would have to be addressed are not insignificant. How 
far into a juror’s background should the state be allowed to go in terrorist trials? 
And at what point does eliminating certain jurors mean that the defendant is no 
longer being tried by his or her peers? Another concern is how to keep the 
prosecution from using the power for political gains. In the case of Clive 
Ponting, for instance, who was charged under the Official Secrets Act, C3 (the 
head of the vetting section of MI5) vetted a panel of sixty potential jurors. This 
included careful examination of members of the Labour Party, then in 
opposition, believed to be associated with extremist elements in the party. MI5 
conducted “in-depth” inquiries amongst colleagues, neighbors, and friends and 
created a dossier on the prospective jurors’ political and social activities, their 
standing in the community, and the like.128 
While it makes sense to vet potential jurors to reduce the risks posed by 
involving juries in terrorist trials, counterterrorist provisions provide unusual 
power that can be used politically—and that has a tendency to be used in non-
terrorist-related contexts.129 In the Ponting case, the investigation progressed 
relatively far and it focused on members of the opposition—raising political 
concerns. With no definition of what constitutes a “national security” or 
“terrorist” case, moreover, such vetting could be applied to a broad range of 
cases.130 Here, the secret nature of the process works against it: it is hard to 
conduct effective oversight if the information is not made available. 
It may be possible to address these concerns by defining what counts as a 
national security or terrorist trial, and then imposing stringent safeguards on the 
manner in which jurors are stood by or released. (In the United States, the 
continued availability of peremptory challenges, together with the juror 
questionnaire, serves as the functional equivalent.) Where used, however, an 
independent review or audit of the entities conducting the inquiry would help to 
ensure that the authority is not abused. The state may issue special rules to 
solicitors—a practice used in Ireland in the nineteenth century as a way to 
address political violence—to encourage consistency during the trial process131 
 
127. Id. ¶ 3.16.  
128. East, supra note 108, at 527-28. 
129. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1194 (2006). 
130. East, supra note 108, at 530; see also HARRIET HARMAN & JOHN GRIFFITH, 
JUSTICE DESERTED: A SUBVERSION OF THE JURY 27 (1979) (arguing for abolishing the jury 
vetting scheme).  
131. Rule for Guidance of Crown Solicitors in Ireland in Relation to Impannelling of 
Jurors, 1894, Order 33. 
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2. Juror qualifications 
Another possibility might be to broaden juror qualifications, to ensure a 
broader cross-section of the public. Both the United Kingdom and the United 
States use a random method of actual selection.132 Where the two countries 
differ is in the qualifications required for individuals to make it into the jury 
pool. 
The law in Northern Ireland restricts participation by age, mental facility, 
occupation, and criminal record.133 Any persons concerned with the 
administration of justice are ineligible to serve. This includes anyone holding a 
judicial office, justices of the peace, barristers, solicitors and their clerks, the 
Director of Public Prosecution and their staff, officers of the Northern Ireland 
Office or the Lord Chancellor’s Department, members of the Court Service, 
correction officers, law enforcement officers, forensic scientists, and others. It 
also excludes anyone serving in the British military forces.134 
What is interesting about the exclusion of these particular occupations is 
that, while they may introduce concerns about conflict of interest, they are 
already high-risk occupations. Their members face little additional risk by 
serving as jurors. Hence they may be less susceptible to intimidation by 
paramilitaries—and even stronger candidates for jury service than ordinary 
members of the public. 
The law also allows a range of individuals to be excluded from jury 
service, including members of Parliament, members of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, and representatives of the European Parliament. In the interest of the 
performance of their public duties, excusing them makes sense. However, the 
legislation also allows the court to excuse public officials, such as school 
inspectors, mines inspectors, and the Comptroller and Auditor General for 
Northern Ireland. The court may also exclude clergy, teachers, lighthouse 
keepers, medical practitioners, dentists, veterinarians, pharmaceutical chemists, 
and people aged sixty-five to seventy years old.135 
What is curious about many of these occupations is that those in them may 
be less likely to live in paramilitary strongholds, and consequently less likely to 
be targets of coercion. They may have more contact with individuals from 
across the religious divide, making it less likely that they would exhibit blatant 
bias in the conduct of the proceedings. And they may be more keenly aware of 
the need to prevent transferring information from the courtroom to paramilitary 
organizations. This is precisely the group of citizens that the state would want 
to incorporate into its efforts to engage the population in the administration of 
 
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2007). 
133. See The Juries (Northern Ireland) Order, 1996, SI 1996/1141 (N. Ir. 6), ¶ 3(1), 
scheds. 1-2 (requiring that jurors be between ages eighteen and seventy, understand English, 
and be mentally competent). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. sched. 3. 
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justice. As Lord Carlile pointed out, widening the jury pool may dilute the risk 
of intimidation and perverse verdicts—and it would help to move the province 
towards normalization. 
Northern Irish legislation also disqualifies from jury service anyone who 
has been sentenced to five years or more or who has been detained during Her 
Majesty’s pleasure, as well as anyone who in the past ten years has served part 
of a sentence of imprisonment or detention or community service order, or who 
in the past five years was put on probation.136 Unlike the occupational 
restrictions, these limits, particularly in the paramilitary context, do make 
sense. To ensure that individuals who have served time are excluded, the 
government proposed “routine criminal record checks to identify disqualified 
jurors.”137 The suggestion of using a central juror administrative body to 
conduct the checks appears to be a reasonable way to accomplish this.138 
As a general matter, the Blair government is reluctant to reduce the 
occupational restrictions on the jury pool in Northern Ireland. While it “would 
represent another move towards normalisation, the impact of such a measure on 
jury intimidation and perverse verdicts is unclear. Conversely, amending the 
criteria to include previously exempted groups may raise perception issues, 
particularly if combined with the abolition of defence’s right of peremptory 
challenge.”139 The government concludes, “It is considered appropriate to defer 
work on widening the jury pool until after the current reforms have been 
implemented and have had time to bed down.”140 
Even as the government is proposing to maintain occupational distinctions 
in Northern Ireland, it is eliminating them in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
Whereas before a property qualification and an educational requirement existed 
in Britain to reduce the potential for politicization and intimidation, now neither 
distinction is exercised, and members of almost all professions are eligible to 
serve as jurors.141 
Previously, as in Northern Ireland, a range of professions also were 
excusable as of right: parliamentarians (peers and peeresses entitled to receive 
writs of summons to attend the House of Lords, members of the House of 
Commons, and officers of the House of Commons), the military forces, and 
those in medical and other similar professions (such as medical practitioners, 
dentists, nurses, midwives, veterinary surgeons and veterinary practitioners, 
and pharmaceutical chemists).142 Now, however, the only professionals 
excusable as of right are those serving full time in Her Majesty’s naval, 
 
136. Id. sched. 1. 
137. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶ 3.3. 
138. Id. ¶ 3.6. 
139. Id. ¶ 3.25. 
140. Id. ¶ 3.26. 
141. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 321, sched. 33. 
142. Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, sched. 1. 
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military, or air forces—where the commanding officer certifies that it would be 
prejudicial to the efficient running of the service.143 
As in Northern Ireland, individuals who have been imprisoned for life or 
five or more years, detainees, and anyone serving any part of sentence of 
imprisonment or detention for three months or more are disqualified.144 In 
1984, the state extended exclusion to a broader range of crimes and 
incorporated anyone who had served any term of imprisonment in the past ten 
years.145 
The United States does not have such a long list of occupations formally 
prevented from taking part in jury trial. There are instead just three groups that 
are exempt from federal jury service: members of the armed forces on active 
duty, members of professional fire and police departments, and “public 
officers” of federal, state or local governments, who are actively engaged full-
time in the performance of public duty.146 This does not mean, though, that all 
government employees are barred. (The Supreme Court has held that their 
inclusion in the jury pool is consistent with the Sixth Amendment.)147 
Outside of these areas, anyone who is a U.S. citizen, at least eighteen years 
of age, proficient in English, not subject to any felony charges or convictions 
(unless the individual’s civil rights have been restored legally), and not subject 
to any mental or physical condition that would disqualify the individual may 
serve as a juror in federal court.148 It falls to each judicial district to draw up a 
formal, written plan for selecting jurors.149 The scheme must ensure that a fair 
cross-section of the community makes up the pool from which jurors are drawn 
at random.150 Federal law requires that voter registration lists, or lists of actual 
voters, provide the source of names for federal court juries. These can be 
supplemented with other appropriate lists, such as drivers’ records.151 
3. Geographic draw and change of venue 
Another way in which the risks posed by terrorist trial could be reduced is 
by expanding the geographic region whence jurors are drawn—perhaps to the 
point of changing the venue itself. This solution is not a new way to address 
 
143. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 321, sched. 33(5)-(9). 
144. Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, sched. 1. 
145. Juries (Disqualification) Act, 1984, c. 34; see also Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 
44, § 321, sched. 33(15). 
146. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (2007).  
147. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 137 (1936); see also Smith v. United 
States, 180 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that the inclusion of government employees 
as jurors did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights). 
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2007). 
149. Id. § 1863. 
150. Id. § 1861. 
151. Id. § 1863. 
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political violence in Ireland. In the nineteenth century, a special inquiry into 
juries suggested that “in the case of all crimes of a political or agrarian 
complexion it is desirable to offer every facility for the removal of the trials 
whenever the circumstances of the locality appear to call for such a step.”152 
That report, however, was written prior to partition—when there were thirty-
two counties from which to choose. Northern Ireland is now limited to just six 
counties, which are closely tied by political and familial links. 
The jury pool in Northern Ireland, moreover, is not geographically limited. 
To address geographic concerns, then—that is, to dilute the number of jurors 
coming from areas of high paramilitary influence—the state may rely on 
standing by. The Northern Ireland Office further has suggested that the 
elimination of peremptories will prevent defendants from being able to stack 
the jury with members from particular areas.153 There is little risk of jury 
stacking, however, unless defendants may use many peremptory challenges. 
With a sufficiently limited number of peremptory challenges, the defense may 
be more likely to use them in an affirmative matter—that is, to eliminate 
individuals from opposing paramilitary strongholds—than to take a chance that 
the next individual to be called (or the fifth, or tenth) came from an area their 
organization controlled. 
The possibility of a change in venue may be more applicable to the United 
States. There, the Sixth Amendment, applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of due 
process, guarantee the right to an impartial jury.154 The central consideration is 
not whether the community is aware of the case, but whether the jurors have 
such set opinions at the trial itself that they may be unable to be an impartial 
judge of the defendant’s guilt.155 For the most part, the weight of such bias is 
determined through issuing juror questionnaires and through questioning at voir 
dire. In some cases, however, a crime may be so extraordinary that the court 
anticipates that no jury empanelled in the area of the crime would be 
sufficiently impartial. This may be particularly true of terrorist trials. In such 
instances, the judge can approve a change in venue.156 
The risk of an unfair trial was precisely the reason, for instance, why Judge 
Matsch moved Timothy McVeigh’s trial from Oklahoma City, where he was 
accused of the 1995 Murrah Federal Building bombing, to Colorado.157 Judge 
Matsch explained that trust in the jurors’ ability to be fair 
 
152. SELECT COMM. ON IRISH JURY LAWS, supra note 7, ¶ 63.  
153. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶ 1.1 (proposing to “reduce the risk of 
partisan juries by enhancing the random selection of jurors”). 
154. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). 
155. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). 
156. An appeals court has ruled that it is permissible to exclude jurors who live where 
the crime was committed without giving any reason, unless requested to do so. See Myers v. 
United States, 15 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1926). 
157. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (holding 
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diminishes when the prior exposure is such that it evokes strong emotional 
responses or such an identification with those directly affected by the conduct 
at issue that the jurors feel a personal stake in the outcome. That is also true 
when there is such identification with a community point of view that jurors 
feel a sense of obligation to reach a result which will find general acceptance 
in the relevant audience.158 
Although McVeigh’s trial moved to an entirely different state, the bar for 
changing venues in the United States is rather high. For instance, in one first-
degree murder case, the court denied the defendant’s motion for change of 
venue—although eleven of the thirty-nine venirepersons were excluded 
because of their exposure to pretrial publicity or because they were friends with 
the victim or the victim’s family.159 All of the jurors had been exposed to 
pretrial publicity; and all but one of the jurors empanelled had been customers 
in the victim’s store.160 
Terrorist trials too have proven resistant. In June 2002, for instance, 
Zacharias Moussaoui’s efforts to have his trial moved from Virginia to Denver 
failed. John Walker Lindh, as was earlier noted, similarly failed to get his trial 
moved out of Virginia. 
With this said, for reasons that extend well beyond the two regions, there is 
a legitimate question in an age of constant news coverage as to the degree to 
which change of venue would be effective. Although the immediate effect of a 
terrorist attack is local, its broader target is national in scope. And terrorists 
often make use of spectacular or particularly egregious violence to draw 
attention to their cause. The whole purpose of terrorism is to generate as much 
attention as possible, to underscore the terrorist organization’s aims. Together 
with national media coverage, the idea that particularly significant attacks stay 
local deserves question. Nevertheless, this may not always be the case. Where 
particular regions are vulnerable to future attacks, or have suffered significantly 
in recent incidents, change of venue may mitigate bias. 
4. Alternate jurors 
Yet another way to address potential intimidation of jurors is to call more 
jurors than are necessary and to retain the additional jurors as alternates. In the 
United States, for instance, a federal court is allowed to impanel up to six 
alternate jurors so that any jurors unable to perform their duties, or disqualified, 
 
that evidence established that prejudice against defendants was so great that they could not 
obtain fair and impartial trial anywhere in Oklahoma, and change of venue to Colorado was 
appropriate). 
158. Id. at 1473; see also Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(allowing change of venue in non-terrorist case). 
159. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir. 1994). 
160. Id. 
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can be replaced.161 The alternates are selected and sworn in the same way as 
other jurors and replace jurors in the same sequence in which the alternates 
were selected.162 Once seated, their authority is the same as the other jurors.163 
The court can retain alternates even after the jury retires to deliberate. Like 
regular jurors, those retained are not allowed to discuss the case with anyone 
until they are either discharged or used in place of another juror.164 The 
practice of drawing alternate jurors has been used in terrorist trials. In the 
Moussaoui trial, for example, the judge excused all five alternates immediately 
before deliberations.165 
Alternates provide the judge with a way to address juror tampering or cases 
of clear bias that emerge during trial. In this sense, their use is similar to rules 
that allow the court case to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors. In Northern 
Ireland, for instance, the trial can continue as long as nine of the original twelve 
are present.166 In the United States, any defendant who alleges implied juror 
bias is entitled to a hearing where he or she can prove actual juror bias. If the 
defendant succeeds, the trial can continue with fewer jurors. 
There is another way, however, that alternates could be used to dilute the 
risk posed by terrorist organizations. One possibility would be to draw twice—
or thrice—the number of jurors required to decide the case. All twenty-four, or 
thirty-six, could sit through the entire trial. Immediately before deliberation, the 
final twelve could be drawn by lot and adjourn to deliberate. There is some 
precedent for this: in the state of Washington, for instance, where the practice 
was to draw a thirteenth juror who was discharged before the case was given to 
the jury, the lower courts found this practice to be constitutional.167 
The advantage of this approach is that terrorist groups could not easily 
single out enough jurors before the deliberations to ensure that at least one of 
the final twelve would cave in to their threat. On the other hand, such a system 
would help little if jurors’ fears arose not from an overt threat, but from the 
general risk that paramilitary organizations would learn of their decisions 
during trial and seek retribution. In a place like Northern Ireland, it would still 
be possible for terrorist groups to determine the identity of those serving as the 
final petit jury. 
In the United States, the disagreement about alternates appears to center on 
whether alternates would be allowed to sit through the jury deliberations. The 
courts are split: the Seventh Circuit held that the presence of an alternate juror 
during jury deliberations did not violate right to trial by jury—although the 
 
161. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(1). 
162. Id. R. 24(c)(2).  
163. Id. 
164. Id. R. 24(c)(3). 
165. Minute Entry, United States v. Moussaoui, Cr. No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 
2006), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/DocketSheet1.html. 
166. The Juries (Northern Ireland) Order, 1996, SI 1996/1141 (N. Ir. 6), ¶ 21. 
167. Gibson v. United States, 31 F.2d 19, 21-22 (9th Cir. 1929). 
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alternate could not participate in the deliberation and vote.168 However, the 
Colorado Supreme Court determined that the presence of an alternate juror 
during deliberations created a presumption of prejudice that, if not rebutted, 
required reversal.169 In a case from the District of Columbia, where alternate 
jurors were substituted at the end of the second phase of a bifurcated trial, the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not abridged.170 Discharging the 
alternates before the deliberation, however, might reduce potential conflicts 
with regard to the deliberations themselves. 
B. Juror Constraints 
There are some jury controls in the regular procedure, but many of these go 
against the grain of both British and American jurisprudence in all but the most 
extreme cases. 
1. Jury discharge and directed verdicts 
In both countries, judges have the option of discharging the jury as a result 
of tampering. In England and Wales, if it appears to the judge that coercion has 
occurred, the judge must, before taking concrete steps to discharge the jury, 
inform the parties that he intends to do so and the grounds on which he has 
concluded tampering, and he must give the parties the chance to make 
representations.171 The judge then may discharge the jury and order the trial to 
continue without one only if he is satisfied both that tampering has occurred 
and that continuing the trial without a jury would be fair to the defendant or 
defendants.172 The judge also can order a new trial—with or without a jury.173 
As in the Diplock tribunals in Northern Ireland, where the trial, or a subsequent 
trial, is conducted without a jury, the court must provide a written judgment 
stating the reasons for the conviction.174  
Similarly, where jurors may be exhibiting extreme political bias, finding 
defendants guilty even where common sense might dictate otherwise, the judge 
has the option of directing a verdict of not guilty.  
While this power offers some protection against scapegoating, the level of 
protection ought not to be overestimated. There is a gap between the jury’s 
finding a defendant guilty, and the judge’s directing an acquittal, where 
although the judge would have ruled differently, he will not be willing to 
 
168. Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981). 
169. People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 1984). 
170. Shreeves v. United States, 395 A.2d 774 (D.C. 1978). 
171. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 46(2) (Eng.). 
172. Id. § 46(3). 
173. Id. § 46(4)-(7). 
174. Id. § 48. 
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interfere with the jury’s determination. One study in the United Kingdom found 
that some 78-87% of jury verdicts are considered by judges to be 
“understandable in the light of the evidence.”175 In the United States, the 
standard—whether a reasonable jury could have come to a similar 
conclusion—makes it unlikely that judges will enter a directed verdict. Where 
judges are elected, the likelihood becomes even more remote: no judge who 
depends upon a popular vote will want to be seen as “soft” on terrorism. And 
an estimated 87% of the judges in the United States at some point face 
electors.176 Thus, while a directed verdict may, at the outside, offer a safety net, 
it would not cover a lot of cases in which miscarriages of justice could occur. 
2. Clearances and classified documents 
Another consideration centers on the risk posed by making jurors, who do 
not have clearances, privy to the methods and substance of intelligence 
collection. Although neither country maintains a professional jury system—
whose members could, for instance, receive clearances—it may be possible to 
create a new classification to cover jurors for the duration of a national security 
trial. Certain information may then be considered within the protection of the 
classification scheme, making any efforts by jurors to discuss the material 
outside of the deliberation room unlawful. 
This approach would require the collection of information on jurors akin to 
the requirements of British law. Its advantages may well outweigh the 
disadvantages incurred in suspending juries altogether.  
Nevertheless, a number of potential drawbacks attend. Extending security 
clearances to jurors raises a potential conflict of interest: security clearances 
fall within the executive—which also prosecutes the case. Another issue to 
consider is the extent to which requiring clearances would delay the trial. 
Under ordinary circumstances, clearances can take months, or even years, to 
secure. The paperwork and research involved may place a significant burden on 
jurors. Requiring clearances for jurors may skew the representation of the jury. 
Instead of a true cross-section—especially one representing a minority or 
immigrant defendant—the make-up of the resulting venire may increase juror 
bias or politicization. Another potential drawback of this approach is that it 
may increase the risk posed to jurors after the trial. Terrorist organizations or 
networks may determine that jurors’ knowledge may be helpful for their 
campaigns. These and other concerns would have to be carefully weighed 
before instituting a separate juror classification process. 
 
175. MICHAEL ZANDER & PAUL HENDERSON, ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
CROWN COURT STUDY 165 (1993). 
176. Dirk Olin, Op-Ed., Courting the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A19. 
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C. Trial Procedure 
The trial procedure offers further opportunities to address terrorist trial 
concerns. This Subpart considers three, none of which is particularly satisfying. 
Jurors could be given heightened security during the proceedings. The penalties 
associated with jury tampering could be increased. And in Northern Ireland, 
automatic appeal based on either fact or law could be extended to jury trials.177 
 
177. Another option might be to permit a decision of the jury by a majority vote. As 
this Article simply provides a broad survey of some possibilities—instead of analyzing in 
detail the complex arguments that mark the requirement of unanimity—it is sufficient to note 
the long history of unanimity in English and American law. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1972). Both countries, though, have precedent for departing from a 
unanimous verdict. In Scotland, where fifteen jurors are empanelled, guilt in criminal trials is 
determined by the majority. See Edwin R. Keedy, Criminal Procedure in Scotland, 3 J. AM. 
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 834, 835, 841 (1913). In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the state of Oregon’s “ten of twelve” rule. The Court ruled that a state court 
criminal conviction by less than a unanimous vote of the jury does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury, as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. It is a statutory requirement that a jury verdict in a federal 
criminal trial be unanimous. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). (Note, however, that this does not 
foreclose potential constitutional issues that might arise, should the number of jurors decline 
substantially below twelve individuals.) Specifically in relation to terrorism, however, 
practical concerns speak against changes in this area—not the least of which relate to the 
seriousness of the penalties contemplated for crimes relating to terrorism. In both countries, 
the potential for life imprisonment often accompanies terrorist charges, and in the United 
States, the penalty may include execution. In addition, while allowing for a majority verdict 
may help to address intimidation, it may exacerbate scapegoating or perverse acquittals. The 
nineteenth century witnessed such concerns in Ireland. See, e.g., SELECT COMM. ON IRISH 
JURY LAWS, supra note 7.  
Alterations to double jeopardy provide another, albeit highly controversial—and in the 
United States potentially unconstitutional—route. British precedent exists: the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act amended the law to eliminate the bar to re-trying a case, where it can be 
demonstrated by the state that further evidence has come to light. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, 
c. 44, §§ 75-79. The legislation went further than Lord Justice Auld did in his 2001 
examination of the criminal courts. That report had suggested that if it was clear a jury had 
not given a full and fair verdict according to the law, and the judge certified his decision, 
another trial could be held. The 2003 legislation directed the court of appeal, which is 
responsible for quashing an acquittal, to consider (a) whether evidence is new and 
compelling, or (b) whether it is “in the interests of justice to proceed with a retrial.” Id. §§ 
77-79. Such expansive language gives the court broad authority. In the United States, the 
guarantee against twice being tried for the same offense is almost sacrosanct. See, e.g., 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); see also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994). 
The Fifth Amendment reads, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The animating 
idea is that the state, with its considerable resources, should not be able to compel a citizen 
to live in a state of perpetual insecurity. Benton, 395 U.S. at 795-96. A distinction, though, 
needs to be drawn between the types of harms that may come from terrorist trials and the 
presence of juries more generally. Where jury tampering has occurred, U.S. courts have 
found that in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the government, a new trial 
can proceed. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 431 F. Supp. 90, 97-98 (D. Md. 1977). 
Where the issue appears instead to be simply the political persuasion of the jurors—
untainted by criminal coercion—the case for violating the ban on double jeopardy is 
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1. Heightened security and juror anonymity 
Perhaps the most obvious response to juror intimidation is to ensure that 
jurors are physically protected from assault. The state could create criteria for 
the conditions under which jurors are entitled to additional police protection,178 
and reassure the jurors that they are protected.179 Lessons learned in the context 
of witness intimidation may be applicable. 
One problem with this approach, though, is that trials end, and where 
terrorist organizations have long institutional memories, the absence of security 
following the trial may allow organizations to take revenge—even years later. 
In the 1980s, for instance, Martin McGartland infiltrated the IRA for the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch.180 He eventually moved to 
Northumberland, England, and assumed a new identity—Martin Ashe. But in 
1999, the IRA found and shot him.181 Eamon Collins was in his twenties when 
he joined the South Down unit of the Provisional IRA. In 1998, he testified 
against Thomas “Slab” Murphy. The following year Collins was beaten and 
stabbed to death as he took his dogs for their morning walk.182 There do not 
have to be many such instances for jurors to feel unprotected—even if elaborate 
security measures are taken during the trial itself. 
Supplying protection for all twelve jurors in every terrorist case for the rest 
of their lives would cost the state a great deal. Protective measures also place 
an unusually high burden on those called to jury service and give rise to the 
question of whether the price of jury participation—i.e., a lifetime of fear for 
oneself and one’s family—is too high. 
One question frequently discussed is to what extent jurors’ identities could 
be masked. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it has been proposed that the 
government restrict “access to personal juror information” and introduce 
“guidelines on jury checks.”183 The problem with this approach is that the 
names, addresses, and occupations of potential jurors are provided to both 
sides. As Lord Carlile observed, jurors would be reassured and the risk of 
 
problematic. 
178. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶ 3.21. 
179. Id. ¶ 3.22. 
180. UK: Manhunt Follows Attack on IRA Informer, BBC NEWS, June 17, 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/371455.stm. 
181. Id.  
182. See Real IRA Denies Collins Murder, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 1999, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/northern_ireland/focus/264438.stm; Stephen Scott, Dead 
Man Talking, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 30, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
Northern_Ireland/Story/0,2763,209158,00.html; see also Is ‘Slab’ Murphy’s Bloody Reign 
Drawing to an End?, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 9, 2005, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/ 
northernirelandassembly/story/0,9061,1588303,00.html. 
183. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 31, ¶ 3.3. 
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intimidation and perverse verdicts lowered if jurors could go to court without 
thinking that the defendant knew their identity.184 
Total anonymity, however, would pose a particular problem for the 
additional checks on jurors, explored in Part III.A of this Article.185 It will be 
recalled that the DPP issued guidance on when and under what conditions 
checks on the jury can be performed in Northern Ireland. Attorney General 
guidelines govern the same in Great Britain. In cases of exceptional public 
importance, or where the state may be particularly sensitive to the jurors’ 
access to state secrets, additional checks can be conducted. It may be possible 
in Northern Ireland to insulate such investigations from individuals connected 
to the case. The police service, for instance, could perform background checks, 
with only jurors’ numbers provided to the prosecution and defense.186 Making 
it a criminal offense for juror information to be provided to any party, without 
specific leave of the court, might also address this concern.187 Other forms of 
public access also could be denied. For instance, where concerns of 
intimidation exist, jurors could be seated out of sight from the public gallery.188 
A separate waiting area would help them to avoid mixing with the public.189 
While laudable, however, these options may be more appropriate for Great 
Britain or the United States than for Northern Ireland.190 In tight-knit areas, it 
may be clear who is going to the courthouse. Paramilitary groups need only to 
identify one juror in order to use that person to find out the others on the panel. 
Whatever the criminal penalty may be for sharing other jurors’ information, 
paramilitary organizations—with access to weapons and highly coercive 
techniques—will be able to ensure compliance. 
The masking of jurors’ identities may be more effective in the United 
States, where it has been used in non-terrorist related trials. (In 1977, the first 
completely anonymous jury sat to determine the guilt of Harlem drug trafficker 
Leroy Barnes.191 For nearly the whole trial, the judge sequestered the 
jurors.192) 
As a legal matter, the lower courts have found that a defendant’s right to an 
impartial jury is not violated when the government requests and the district 
court allows an anonymous jury.193 Similarly, where a substantial risk of jury 
 
184. Id. ¶ 3.7. 
185. Id. ¶ 3.8. 
186. Id. ¶ 3.10 (recommending use of the Police Service of Northern Island (PSNI)). 
187. Id. ¶ 3.20. 
188. Id. ¶ 3.18. 
189. Id. ¶ 3.19. 
190. REVIEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 16.  
191. Matt Hayes, The Inside Scoop on Jury Tampering, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 26, 
2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,104199,00.html. See generally People v. 
Barnes, 400 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
192. Hayes, supra note 191. 
193. United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 569 (7th Cir. 2000).  
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tampering exists, granting anonymity to jurors does not deprive defendants of a 
fair trial.194 In another New York case, involving murder, robbery, and 
extortion linked to gang activity, the district court masked jurors’ identities.195 
It then questioned jurors carefully and selected those who did not exhibit any 
bias.196 The appellate court determined that, under these circumstances, hiding 
the jurors’ identities was constitutional.197 That same year, an appellate court 
offered a set of conditions where it was constitutional for the court to empanel 
an anonymous jury: where an international drug syndicate was involved, and 
there was concern that some harm was posed to jurors—and particularly where 
there was a previous attempt by the defendant to interfere with the judicial 
process (in this case, ordering a hit on a government witness).198 Even where 
the group—but not this particular defendant—is known for intimidation of 
jurors, the courts have held the conditions sufficient for anonymous 
empanelment.199 
2. Increase penalties associated with juror intimidation 
One suggestion made with some frequency is the possibility of increasing 
the penalties associated with jury tampering. Here, it is important to recognize 
that in Northern Ireland it is already illegal to try to coerce—or even 
influence—jury members.200 The 2000 Terrorism Act makes jury intimidation 
a scheduled offense.201 
Similarly, in the United States, it is already illegal to try to influence jurors 
in the exercise of their duties.202 Federal law carries a fine and up to two years 
imprisonment.203 According to the Supreme Court, any private communication, 
contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with jurors during a trial, about the 
trial itself, is considered presumptively prejudicial—if not done in accordance 
with court rules and with full knowledge of the parties present.204 
Increasing penalties associated with such acts, while signaling the 
seriousness with which the state views the crime, may have minimal impact on 
 
194. United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1132 (2d Cir. 1989). 
195. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 794 (2d Cir. 1994). 
196. Id. at 801. 
197. Id. 
198. United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Secret Justice: Anonymous Juries: A Survey of the Law, 
http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/anonymousjuries/survey.html. 
199. United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1376 (2d Cir. 1994). 
200. The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, 1996, SI 1996/3160 (N. Ir. 24), 
¶ 47 (up to five years imprisonment and fine for any actual or threatened harm to a juror). 
201. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 11, sched. 9. For the previous version of the law, 
see Protection of the Person and Property Act (Northern Ireland), 1969, c. 29, § 1 (N. Ir.). 
202. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(c) (2007). 
203. Id. § 201(c). 
204. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). 
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the tendency of organized terrorist groups to use intimidatory tactics. Not only 
is it precisely what such groups specialize in doing, but in capital cases, the 
stakes for engaging in such behavior outweigh a lengthy term of imprisonment. 
Where terrorist organizations instruct their members that they should expect to 
die or to go to prison—as they do in the Provisional IRA—the likelihood of 
state-sanctioned sentences having much effect is limited. In part because of 
these considerations, the British Review Group, which in 2000 examined the 
Diplock courts, failed to identify “any areas where it considers that the creation 
of new offences would materially reduce the chances of intimidation.”205 It 
concluded, “The reality is that the problem in this area has not been the 
adequacy of the legislation but the absence of admissible evidence in individual 
cases.”206 
3. Automatic appeal on fact or law 
One of the protections offered by the Diplock court system is an automatic 
right of appeal, based on either fact or law. This method has been suggested as 
a possible way to address the politicization of juries in the immediate aftermath 
of a terrorist attack.  
One problem with this approach, however, is that juries do not provide 
written, reasoned verdicts. Unlike Diplock judges, who spell out the basis for 
their decisions, juries in both the United Kingdom and the United States come 
to their conclusion in a less transparent manner. They are not professionally 
trained to write out their determinations. 
There may, nevertheless, be a way to transfer some of the strengths of the 
reasoned verdict system to terrorist trials. Namely, the judge could ask the jury 
to address a series of questions related to the elements of the crime. This 
approach has been used in the United Kingdom in libel cases, making the issues 
in contention clearer on appeal. While this stops short of requiring juries to 
provide a set of facts, and comes nowhere near the extensive verdicts issued by 
Diplock judges, requiring reasoned judgments may help to establish some 
protections for terrorist defendants. And it does, at least in the United 
Kingdom, appear to be part of a trend: since 1988, for instance, even 
magistrates have spelled out grounds for reaching their conclusions. 
The automatic right of appeal though raises some concern. While it may be 
helpful for scapegoating, it introduces the question as to why have a jury in the 
first place. There may be other, more effective, ways to address the 
politicization of jurors, without bypassing the role of juries in the deliberative 
process. 
 
205. REVIEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 15.  
206. Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought not to provide a definitive study of jury trial, but, 
more modestly, to raise issues to be considered in the interplay between 
terrorism and the presence of jurors. To this end, a comparison between the 
British and American experience proves illuminating.  
The arguments in favor of suspending jury trials in Northern Ireland, where 
personalized violence greatly increases the risk of juror intimidation—and 
decreases the effectiveness of the alternatives—are strong. Where juries are not 
used, automatic appeal based on fact or law offers important protections to the 
defendant. But as the province moves towards security normalization, a default 
understanding of trial by jury would strengthen the state’s hand. 
The movement to certifying in cases, instead of having the DPP certify out, 
however, changes the political dynamic—one that the state will have to 
address. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the DPP mostly stayed out of the 
political arena, preferring to maintain an independent role. The office made no 
statements to the press during this time, and its hands were tied by legislation: 
where the crime under contention was scheduled, the case automatically went 
before a Diplock judge. Shifting to a system of certifying in, however, may 
place the DPP in a more vulnerable position. A clear set of criteria, handed 
down by Parliament, and the provision of enhanced security for the growing 
number of people at the DPP’s office, may help to reduce the threat. Making 
the DPP’s decision judicially reviewable would offer additional protection. 
Before trials are certified in to the Diplock system, it may be possible to 
pursue some of the alternatives raised in this Article, particularly in the realm 
of juror selection. Part III.A, for instance, emphasized broadening the juror 
pool. Reducing the number of peremptory challenges may help to prevent jury-
packing—even while maintaining at least some peremptories will protect 
against undue conviction from a politicized jury. Simultaneous retention of the 
power to stand by, strictly controlled by clear guidelines, will help the state to 
counter the same. In relation to juror constraints, the potential use of directed 
acquittal, may be of some, albeit limited, effect. In regard to the trial process, 
heightened security for jurors may help to protect them and convey the feeling 
of safety. The use of alternate jurors may further reduce the risks of jury 
tampering, by diluting the pool that could be coerced prior to jury deliberations. 
In the United States, similar risks present themselves, but a different 
historical and constitutional structure exists. The decision to eliminate juries 
from trials against Islamist militants, while in some sense a result of framing 
the issue as “war,” carried with it important weaknesses—while obtaining 
some, but limited gains.  
The ordinary court system worked prior to September 11 and continued to 
work after the attacks as a way to pursue terrorist suspects. There are ways to 
address some of the risks entailed in terrorist trials within the ordinary criminal 
system. Changes to juror selection present perhaps the strongest way to address 
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the deficiencies. In the United States, this translates not into lowering the 
occupational bar to serving on juries (as it does in Northern Ireland), but into 
drawing from a broader geographic region—or changing the trial venue 
altogether. An increased number of alternate jurors, whence the final jury is 
drawn by lot after the trial proceedings and immediately prior to deliberation, 
may provide a way to diminish the potential for jury tampering. As in Northern 
Ireland, in the realm of juror constraints, directed verdicts may, at the outside, 
provide some relief. The possibility also exists, in relation to classified 
materials, to construct a system of classification for jurors, to allow them access 
to intelligence collection methods. This may help to reduce concerns about 
intelligence leaks. The drawbacks, however, would have to be carefully 
considered before the adoption of such a system. In the realm of trial 
procedure, heightened security for jurors may prove effective. Coupled with 
juror anonymity—again, not a practical option in Northern Ireland—the 
potential for coercion may drop considerably. 
One final point to consider is whether and how to prevent such provisions 
from seeping into the criminal realm. In Great Britain, such shifts have already 
occurred: the 2003 Criminal Justice Act provided for the suspension of jury 
trial for fraud and serious crime.207  
If one believes that terrorism can and should be treated differently from 
ordinary crime, then one possibility, at least in the British context, would be to 
use clearly defined, statutory tests that focus not on the crime itself, but on the 
circumstances of the offense and the connections of the defendant.208 The 
current standard under the 2000 Terrorism Act is to assess whether the crime is 
connected with the political affairs of Northern Ireland; however, it does not 
entertain the degree of risk to the administration of justice. 
The British government is considering two elements that could be included 
in the test used to certify cases in to single-judge courts: first, whether the DPP 
is satisfied that the presence of a jury will significantly interfere with the 
administration of justice;209 and second, whether a specific range of 
circumstances holds—linked, perhaps to paramilitary activity or political 
claims. How this second element is defined will or will not limit the application 
of the alternative judicial system to non-terrorist crime.210 In determining 
whether to include offenses linked to serious organized crime or public order, 
due concern must be given to the level of social control exhibited over a 
particular region. Where violence is personal and pervasive, and the community 
extremely close knit, it may be necessary to allow for removing jurors from the 
courtroom even for non-terrorist criminal syndicates. Such cases, however, may 
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be few—suggesting first, a default in favor of jury trial, and second, action to 
mitigate the specific risks raised above. 
